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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Mr. Paul Freadman's article, which was commenced in this Journal in the June, 1950, issue, will be concluded in the issue of December, 1950.

My Impressions of Australia.

Bertrand Russell.

At the end of my eight weeks in Australia I have formed some impressions, but, being gathered in so short a time, they are, of necessity, very superficial, and likely to be in many points mistaken. There is one thing, however, about which I am confident that I am not mistaken, and that is your great kindness to visitors. Everywhere I have received generous hospitality, and I have experienced every wish to make my tour a pleasant one. For this I wish to thank all who have contributed to so pleasant a result.

It is natural to an Englishman to compare Australia with the United States. I had expected to find great similarities, but, in fact, I have been more than struck by the differences. It has seemed to me that Australians on the whole are happier than Americans. They do not seem to have the same restless itch to be always doing something else or being somewhere else. No doubt American restlessness is bound up with American energy and enterprise, and it is possible that if Australia were inhabited by Americans, its resources would be developed more rapidly, but if so this result would be dearly purchased at the price of universal discontent. The possibilities of development in Australia seem to me to be enormous. I think that some of the inhabitants of your big cities are perhaps insufficiently aware of the possible importance of vast undeveloped rural regions. I am in no degree opposed to industrial development in Australia, but the importance of your continent in relation to world economy must be as a producer of food and wool, in regard to both of which there is likely to be an increasing world shortage. The very little that I have been able to see of your northern regions has persuaded me that by means of science and collective enterprise, they can be made immensely more productive than they are at present. It has been said by some that these regions cannot be developed by white labour alone. I do not believe this. White men living in your tropical north seem just as healthy, as well developed and as vigorous as those who live in the south.

I have been struck by a curious difference between individual feelings and technical necessities, particularly in your more sparsely populated areas. People's feelings are those of pioneers. They believe

in individual enterprise, and in what they can achieve by their own energies. In America a hundred years ago when the West was being conquered, this mentality was largely adequate. There was abundance of timber and water; a man could build his own log house, and, as soon as the ground was cleared, he could raise crops. But in Australia the situation is different. Only by very great capital expenditure can its resources be developed. The Snowy Mountains irrigation project—to take a well-known example—requires an expenditure which is beyond that of private capital. Throughout the sparsely populated districts, road, rail and air communications are vital, but cannot be expected to yield private profit. The admirable flying doctor service, which is mainly supported by those who use it, requires a Government subsidy, which, I should have thought, ought to be larger than it is. The scientific study of possibilities is evidently a matter to be undertaken at Government expense, and while something is already being done in this direction, I am sure that much more could be done with profit to the community. The individual Australian pioneer is in all these ways more dependent upon the Government than the pioneers of other regions in former times. In spite of this, his instinctive attitude to Government is one of suspicion. He is more impressed by activities which the Government forbids than by those which it makes possible. I think perhaps this attitude is wholesome since it prevents unnecessary encroachments upon individual liberty, but it can be carried too far if it involves a refusal to vote public money where public enterprise is essential.

If your resources are to be developed as they should be, you require, side by side with technical developments, a corresponding increase of population. This is necessary also on other grounds: if Australians are to hold their own as a white man's outpost on the borders of Asia, they can hardly hope to be successful while their population is no larger than that of London. From the point of view of defence, as well as from that of development, there should be energetic encouragement of immigration on a large scale, even though this may involve considerable capital expenditure. A European who has never been in your country does not easily realize the difficulties involved in your geographical position, and I count it among the benefits I have derived from my time among you, that I am more aware of your international problems than I was before. A long term solution of these problems is only possible by a parallel development of technical progress, and large scale immigration.

No country is perfect, and you will, I am sure, bear with me if I mention some matters in which I think improvement is possible.

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I have had some opportunity of studying the treatment of the aborigines in Australia, and while I am aware that this is rapidly improving, there seems to me to be still room for a considerable advance. Both popular feeling and the police seem unwilling to grant to the aborigines elementary rights of justice. Their tribal organization is largely dissolved, their best lands have been taken from them, and many of them are left helpless and hopeless through no fault of their own. This places a heavy responsibility upon white men, and those who are endeavouring to fulfil this responsibility deserve, I think, more co-operation from the general public than they are apt to receive.

Another thing in which I think here is much more room for improvement is your sources of public information. There has been a general belief in Australia in recent years that England was in a bad way, and that people were suffering from an insufficiency of food. The truth is that the average inhabitant of England has been receiving more adequate nourishment during the last few years than at any previous period in history. The misinformation which has been disseminated in Australia has been part of a deliberate propaganda against the Labour Party. The Labour Party in England when it came into power in 1945 was faced with a very difficult situation, which it coped with vigorously and honestly without too much regard for popularity. I wonder how Australians who believe that England has been in a bad way account for the fact that so few of those who desire to settle in Australia are English? It is true that now, owing to the threatening international situation, England will be obliged to revert to a regime of austerity from which it had emerged, but there would certainly be no less austerity if a different Government were in power.

One of the most noteworthy characteristics of the modern world is increasing integration. It is less and less possible for communities to live to themselves. In old days a village could live on its own produce with very little relation to the outside world, but now this sort of thing is impossible. In the early eighteenth century in England roads were almost impassable, but were the only means of communication between different places. In such a community local feeling could develop without much harm, and few villagers needed a knowledge of world conditions. Now all this is different. The profit to be derived from sheep or cattle depends upon the export trade, and exports depend upon complicated conditions of currency and trade agreements. Remote regions are utterly dependent upon means of communication, and will be more and more dependent upon large scale irrigation works and upon scientific

research. Since water-sheds have no respect for State boundaries, large irrigation works are likely to require action by the Commonwealth Government. Local feeling, whether in a city, a district or a State, is liable to become an obstacle to development, and the functions of the Commonwealth Government will, for technical reasons, almost inevitably increase. Beyond the confines of Australia the fortunes and the very lives of Australians may depend upon distant events—upon the fortunes of war in Europe or the Middle East. For good or ill the world has to be thought of as a unity. An atom bomb dropped on New York might be as fatal to Australia as an atom bomb dropped on Sydney. We have to learn to make our thoughts less parochial than they used to be—not that we should cease to love our own country whichever it may be, but that we should realize more fully than some of us do how the fate of our own country is linked to that of others. This is the sort of thing which could be taught in schools and in the course of instruction in history. I think all this could be taught in a way to give to Australians an increased sense of their individual and collective importance in the history of the human species. Civilizations which owe their origin to Western Europe have discovered a way of life in many ways better than any that former times have known, and this is especially notable in Australia. You have in Australia no great poverty. You have opportunities of enterprise for all who are energetic and vigorous. You have a vast country to be conquered. You have freedom and democracy, and a high level of general education. You have diffused throughout the population various good things which in former times were the privilege of a fortunate minority. If our Western way of life were to become general, these advantages could in time extend to all parts of the world. But if the world is to revert to a form of government in which the few can tyrannize over the many, as happens wherever the Russians have control, mankind would lose—perhaps for centuries—the possibility, which now exists, of making the whole world as happy as Australia is already. You Australians have a great part to play as pioneers, not only in the development of your continent, but in pointing the way to a happier destiny for man throughout the centuries to come. This is a noble ambition, and I should wish to see it inspiring your national life and the thoughts and hopes of the young. I am a firm believer in your capacity to play your part in this great work, and I leave your shores with more hope for mankind than I had before I came among you.

Korea—Source of Conflict.

Constance Duncan.

In the urgency of the Allied effort to overthrow Japan, it would appear that too little consideration was given to the ultimate results of Japan's defeat on the Asiatic balance of power. The significance of Korea in Far Eastern politics was unfortunately underestimated. Except for a clause in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 "that in due course Korea shall become free and independent," which was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration and with which the U.S.S.R. associated itself upon its declaration of war on Japan, the only other consideration which appears to have been given Korea was the plan for the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese troops there. It was then agreed that the U.S.S.R. should be responsible as far south as the 38th parallel in Korea, and that this would also define the northern limit of American responsibility.

Lack both of first-hand knowledge of Korea by the American Occupation Forces and of good planning at Washington for the future administration to be established there, emphasised the minor role which it was anticipated Korea would play in the post-war world. American army officers who had received any special training in civil affairs had been coached to take part only in the Military Government in Japan and had some knowledge of the Japanese language. They were not therefore familiar either with the social and political background of Korea nor with its language. This made the American Command in Korea particularly dependent on its Korean advisers.

The Korean peninsula has proved historically to be the key to political and military power in the whole area of Asia north of the Himalayas. Japan fought two wars (with China 1894-95 and with Russia 1904-05) to gain control of Korea, and having established herself there in 1911 set out to develop the peninsula as a base and corridor of conquest leading to Manchuria, China and South East Asia. Soviet imperialism in this part of the world follows closely the pattern of Czarist Russia. For 75 years Russia tried to gain control of the ice-free ports in Manchuria as well as those in Korea which led into the Pacific. Chinese policy on the other hand has been to maintain Korean neutrality as a buffer against attacks by Russia and Japan.

In the vacuum caused by the defeat of Japan there poured in power from opposite directions—from the U.S.A. with all the difficulties of long sea communications, and from the U.S.S.R. with the advantages of a railway linking Moscow to Pyeng Yang and Pusan. In the post-war world, Korea provided the only place where the armies of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. glared at each other across an imaginary line without the presence of the armed forces of other powers. It has also provided the only field laboratory where the rival ways of life of Western Democracy and Communist Dictatorship have been imposed on a colonial people. While many efforts have been made by the American Command to consider and improve the welfare of the Korean people—it was impossible to find anything comparable in the Soviet zone in 1946—Koreans were asking (and how much more they must be today) why their country, liberated after 40 years' of exploitation by Japan for her own purposes, should have been immediately sacrificed as the anvil on which the post-war ideological conflict should be hammered out.

The Korean Economy.

The end of World War II meant to the Koreans liberation from Japan, but it also presented them with grave economic problems. The whole of the economic structure had been keyed into that of Japan and had never functioned as a self-sufficient unit. Japanese technicians and managers held all the key positions: Japanese corporations exploited Korea's mineral resources: Japanese landlords had acquired 20 per cent. of the farm land, including most of the best, and the agricultural products of Korea found their way to the markets of Japan. Although the Japanese resident in Korea represented only 2 per cent. of the gainfully employed population, they held 40 per cent. of the positions in public and professional life. After the liberation expropriated Japanese property represented 75 per cent. of the corporate wealth of Korea. Economic separation from Japan, removal of controls and repatriation of Japanese technicians brought about a complete collapse of the Korean economy from which it has never recovered.

This initial difficulty caused by divorcing her economy from Japan, was greatly enhanced by the arbitrary division of Korea at the 38th parallel which amounted to the severing of her life-line. South Korea is a little smaller than the north and contains two-thirds of the population, or 20 million. It contains good paddy fields and while potentially rich in foodstuffs, is relatively poor in minerals and heavy industries. North Korea, whose climate does not permit it to grow rice, cultivates wheat, millet and beans and produces about as much food per capita of the population as the South.

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It has the mines, the heavy industries, the chemical fertiliser industry, and most important of all the, the hydro-electric power plants of the Yalu River. Ever since the bi-zonal occupation began, South Korean farmers have suffered from a shortage of fertilisers and have had to depend on American imports.

Industry in the South consists mainly of small plants producing consumer goods and as these have only been able to function at 20-30 per cent. of their capacity, there has been an almost complete dearth of goods in the shops, and the few that have been available have been priced as high as 100 times their pre-war value. The economic problems of the South have been greatly aggravated by a rapid increase in the population caused by the repatriation of 1½ million Koreans from Japan, China and other Pacific countries, as well as by the arrival of approximately 2 million of their compatriots who have preferred to take their life in their hands and escape from the Soviet zone in North Korea.

Added to the other economic difficulties of South Korea there has been a very severe food shortage. This has largely been caused by a 30 per cent. drop in production at a time when the population was rapidly increasing. Factors in the decreased production are lack of fertilisers and problems met with in the rice collection programmes due to the lack of inducement goods for the farmers. After an initial period when the American Command chose to waive rice controls and rationing as implemented by the Japanese, it was forced to re-establish a Rice Collection programme and severe rationing. As these measures failed to provide the minimum necessary to prevent starvation, they had to import food from the U.S.A. to enable the target of 1,550 calories per person per day to be reached. At the same time large quantities of fertilisers have been obtained from abroad for the farmers and production of food has made a notable increase since 1945. It was hoped that with this year's harvest, South Korea would have become self-sufficient again.

North Korea.

It is very difficult to get any clear picture of economic conditions in North Korea and I am relying on conditions as we found them in the summer of 1946. So far as food was concerned, it was in even shorter supply than in the South. Whereas the U.S. Army was not permitted to eat a grain of rice, a piece of fruit or any other food grown in the country it was occupying, but imported all its supplies plus about half a million metric tons of food for the Koreans, the 250,00 Russian troops lived entirely off the land in impoverished North Korea. Judging by the 7 fried eggs supplied daily to each of us at breakfast by the Russian cook at Pyeng Yang,

as well as other evidence, the Russians had no qualms about stealing food on an extravagant scale from the Korean farmers.

One of the tasks of the U.N.R.R.A. Mission was to try and ascertain the extent of industrial activity in the Soviet zone, in order to report to headquarters on the need for industrial rehabilitation items requested by the U.S.S.R. Command. But despite the advantages which would accrue to the Occupation authorities if the Mission were able to confirm their request for spare parts for machines and raw materials for industry, we were only permitted to see inside a couple of unimportant factories in Pyeng Yang. Judging by the few chimneys which were emitting smoke we could only assume that there was very little industrial activity after 10 months' Occupation by the U.S.S.R. The Mission was refused permission to travel to the coastal towns of the north-east where the heavy industries were located, and so far as consumer goods were concerned, these were even less in evidence in the shops and markets of Pyeng Yang than in Seoul.

Korean Independence Movement.

The Koreans who have dominated the political scene since liberation have all been drawn from the leaders of the Independence Movement which dates back to 1919. In that year thirty-three Korean leaders proclaimed a Declaration of Independence and large scale demonstrations took place throughout Korea. At the same time Dr. Kim Kyusic presented a petition from Korea to the Versailles Conference asking for recognition of independence. When a guest in Dr. Kim's home in 1946, I was regaled with lively anecdotes concerning his meeting with our "Billy" Hughes at Versailles and it was evident that he epitomised Australia for this Korean politician.

The Korean bid for political freedom having been refused by the Allies, Japan turned ferociously on the demonstrators and killed hundreds and imprisoned tens of thousands of young Koreans. The ringleaders of the movement were forced to fly for their lives and took refuge in Shanghai where they established a Korean Provisional Government and elected Dr. Syngman Rhee as President. During the long interval which elapsed until V.J. Day 1945 when their country was finally liberated from the Japanese this Provisional Government (K.P.G.) continued with headquarters in China and representatives in both the U.S.A. and Hawaii.

After the 1919 uprising another section of Korean nationalists crossed the border into Manchuria and joined up with the Korean Army of Independence under General Lui Yunghui. At Shanghai

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a difference of opinion soon emerged amongst the exiled leaders. The more conservative group under Syngman Rhee wanted to spend their funds and energies enlisting the help of missionary circles in the United States, while the more radical group under General Lui wanted to organise open fighting with the Japanese and co-operate with Russia. This split gradually widened until the fundamental cleavage between right and left was established amongst members of the Independent Movement.

After Pearl Harbour the Provisional Government which was closely associated with Chiang Kai Shek and had followed him to Chungking, did its best to obtain recognition by the Allied Powers as the official Provisional Government of Korea, but while the Allies were not unsympathetic to the cause of Korean independence, they would not grant it recognition. Later, when the San Francisco Conference was called, Kim Koo, who had become the President of the K.P.G., wrote to China, Great Britain and the U.S.A. requesting the privilege of sending a delegation to the Conference. This request was also refused.

In June 1945, the Acting Secretary of State (Joseph C. Drew) made a Press Release denying charges that at Yalta a secret agreement had been made to turn Korea over to the Russians. After stating that it was his Government's intention to fulfil its commitments in regard to the Cairo Declaration, Mr. Drew stated that the K.P.G. was not recognised because it had never exercised administrative authority over any part of Korea and could not be regarded as representative of the Korean people today—"It is the policy of this Government in dealing with such groups as the K.P.G. to avoid taking action which might, when the victory of the United Nations is achieved, tend to compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the ultimate form and personnel of the Government which they may wish to establish."

U.S. Military Government's Political Policy.

When the American and Russian Forces arrived in Korea they found that in the two weeks that had elapsed since V.J. Day, the Koreans had lost no time in setting up the "Korean People's Republic" with committees organised throughout the country. A moderate leftist Lyuh Woon Hyung was the leader of this movement in Seoul and approached the U.S. Commander (Lt.-General John R. Hodge) with the proposal that the People's Republic should be recognised as the Government of Korea. With typical antagonism for any movement that was even mildly socialist and therefore "communist", the proposal met with a blunt refusal and the local committees of the People's Republic were promptly disbanded

south of the 38th parallel. At the same time the Americans called on the hated Japanese Government General to carry on their administration in Korea under the authority of the Army. This met with such an outcry both in Korea and the United States, that General Hodge was forced to change his tactics and dismiss the Japanese. He then set up the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea. This initial blunder of the Occupying Authorities made many Koreans suspicious of the aims of the Americans and lost them the support of many Korean moderates. Nor was the position very much improved, from the point of view of the moderates, when the Americans accepted as their advisers the leaders of the conservative group in the erstwhile Provisional Government who had been absent from Korea for 35 years and had therefore no experience of suffering under the Japanese wartime regime.

The exiled leaders were all old men, and the passage of time had made them all very conservative in their views, if not reactionary. The youngest, Dr. Kim Kyusic, was about 65 and was the most liberally minded. Next came Dr. Syngman Rhee who was about 10 years his senior and very reactionary and then Kim Koo who was nearly 80. The return of these leaders to Korea had been facilitated by the U.S. Command and the first to arrive was Dr. Syngman Rhee in early October. Dr. Rhee was well known as a young revolutionary who had suffered imprisonment and who had later become the first President of the Provisional Government. When he first arrived, Dr. Rhee gave his loyalty to Kim Koo, the last President of the K.P.G., but he soon came to realise that he was far and away the best known of the exiled leaders and therefore made his bid for a position of supremacy. He did this by waging an uncompromising battle of words against the Russians and their Communist collaborators in North Korea. This soon gained for Rhee the support of many religious people, and business and professional leaders all sincerely anti-communist. But those who rallied around "America's man" also included many large landlords, opportunistic politicians and Koreans labelled as Japanese collaborators, who were interested primarily in personal gain from the establishment of an extremely rightist regime. In the eyes of the critics, this sponsorship of Syngman Rhee by the U.S. Military authorities (he had been personally presented to the Koreans by General Hodge), was hardly in line with the professed American policy of leaving the Koreans free to choose their own Government. As the situation crystallised into pro- and anti-communist groups, the influence of this Elder Statesmen with all those opposed to the Soviet, rapidly increased, and Dr. Rhee became the dominant figure in South Korean politics whose nominees swept the polls in two elections.

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At the same time it has been an open secret that six months after his return to Korea Dr. Rhee became *persona non grata* with the U.S. Military authorities, who were, however, powerless to shake themselves free from his lieutenants.

Dr. Kim Kyusic who was the first Foreign Minister of the K.P.G. later became the leader of the moderate leftist Korean Nationalist Revolutionary Party in China. Finally, when efforts were made to widen the basis of the Provisional Government, Kim Kyusic became its Vice President and leader of the "loyal opposition". Since his return to Korea he has been acclaimed as the spiritual leader of the moderate elements in South Korea. He was appointed by the Americans as the President of the Interim Assembly, a body established in late 1946, half of whose members were elected and half appointed, where he demonstrated many of the qualities of a genuine liberal statesman. Unfortunately Dr. Kim suffers from constant ill-health which at times mitigates against the wisdom of his judgment.

The third of the exiled leaders, Kim Koo, returned to Korea in November, bringing with him from Chungking 30 members of the Provisional Korean Government. As its President he insisted that he represented the only government with a mandate from the people, and as such could not either participate in the South Korean Interim Government or support Syngman Rhee's demand for a separate election to establish an independent government in South Korea. In June last year Kim Koo was assassinated by a Korean Army officer ostensibly as the result of differences within the Korean Independence Party of which Kim Koo was the leader.

Efforts Towards Unification.

From the outset of the Occupation it was evident that the 38th parallel, which was intended merely to define military responsibility for disarming the Japanese, was viewed by the Russians as a political frontier severing all economic, social and political life in the two zones. All early American efforts to end the partition thus created and reunite the two halves of Korea proved unsuccessful. The U.S. therefore decided to bring the subject of Korea up for discussion at the Foreign Ministers Conference in December, 1945. The Conference agreed to an American proposal that Korea should serve a five year apprenticeship before being granted complete independence, and for this purpose should be placed under the trusteeship of the U.S., U.K., China and the U.S.S.R. The announcement of this decision at the end of December hurt the national pride of the Koreans and brought a storm of protest from all parties. The Korean Communists soon found that the party line eman-

ating from Moscow favoured complete fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement and they had therefore to make a volte face and leave the protesting to the rightists. Mass meetings and demonstrations against the trusteeship proposal were held throughout South Korea.

It happened that the morning after the arrival in Seoul of the U.N.R.R.A. Mission we drove to the Capitol Building, Headquarters of the U.S. Military Government, about 7.30 am. Standing in the snow at the gates of the Capitol was a large crowd of Korean women holding banners. When our car entered the gates, hundreds of Korean flags fluttered and banners were held aloft. We were at a loss to understand this demonstration until we learnt we had been mistaken for a car load of the first Russian representatives to enter South Korea. They had come to a conference on the setting up of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission whose task it was to implement the Moscow Agreement with particular reference to the Trusteeship Clause. The Korean women had stood in the snow in the cold of a mid-winter dawn to take the first opportunity of impressing on the Russians, as they had already impressed on the Americans, that Koreans were wholeheartedly opposed to the idea of a Trusteeship for their country.

When the Joint Commission convened in Seoul a few weeks later, it soon became evident that a stalemate had been reached in the negotiations, and it gradually leaked out that the cause was a difference in interpretation of the phrase in the Moscow Agreement which provided that a "provisional Korean democratic government" should be established on the basis of recommendations made by the Joint Commission after consultation with "Korean democratic parties and social organisations". As anti-trusteeship sentiment became identified with the extreme rightists in South Korea, the Soviet representatives on the Joint Commission defined the 'democratic parties and social organisations' as those which supported the Moscow Agreement and were in favour of trusteeship. Had such a definition been adopted by the Commission, it would have debarred from consultation on the provisional government to be established, virtually all political parties and individuals in South Korea with the exception of the Communist Party and a few fellow travellers. Further, it would have ruled out all possibility of Kim Koo, Kim Kyusic and Syngman Rhee playing any part in the proposed government.

The U.S. delegation on the Joint Commission defended the right of Koreans to hold and express views opposed to trusteeship, provided they would co-operate with the Joint Commission in its work. After 6 weeks of wrangling on this question, the Commission

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adjourned without resolving the issue. It only reconvened after about a year and when the subject had been taken up at a higher level between the Secretary of State and the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister. When the Joint Commission met in May, 1947, it seemed at first that the Russians had adopted a more reasonable attitude, but the old question about eligibility for consultation soon raised its head. This basic disagreement on the subject of freedom of speech poisoned the negotiations, and it was clear that American attempts to establish Korean unity on a compromise basis were unavailing. It seemed that the Russians were determined to have either Communist rule in a united Korea, or else in a separate North Korea. They were not prepared to agree to a united Korea in which Communist dominance was not assured.

It seems very likely that the Joint Commission was doomed to failure from the beginning, owing to the great divergence in aims and method of the American and Soviet Occupations. But the rightist leaders, both Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee must take some responsibility for the breakdown in so much that they did not hesitate to obstruct the efforts which the Americans were making to defend the rights of their respective groups to participate in the formation of a provisional government. Dr. Rhee was already loudly advocating the holding of a general election to set up a separate government in South Korea where he knew his own influence to be paramount and could therefore feel confident that such a development would place him in charge of the government. This ambition blinded Dr. Rhee to the larger issue of unification and eventual independence of Korea and caused great embarrassment to those who were pursuing these ideals. It is unfortunate that in any attempt to analyse the factors which brought about the present tragedy in Korea, attention must be drawn to the lack among most Korean leaders of a sense of public duty which puts the welfare of the nation before personal ambition. Men capable of an unselfish devotion to their country have been singularly lacking from the post-war scene in Korea.

Conditions in North Korea.

Upon its arrival in North Korea the Soviet Command adapted the committees of the Korean People's Republic to its own purposes and set up the facade of a Korean administration called the Provisional People's Committee. All political parties with the exception of the Communist Party, and allied groups, were suppressed. Kim Ilsung, a communist member of the exiled Independence Movement in Manchuria, was brought back to Pyeng Yang where he was given the honorary rank of General (and installed as

the nominal head of the Government). The Communists and their fellow travellers were formed into the "New People's Party" whose endorsed candidates were returned at the elections held in November, 1946. The following February, the "National Committee of Northern Korea" met, consisting of 1,159 delegates, including 158 women.

When the U.N.R.R.A. Mission went to North Korea in the summer of 1946 we were billeted in the home of General Shitkov, leader of the Soviet Delegation at the Joint Commission, who was paying a visit to Moscow at the time. The Russians did their best to prevent us having any direct contact with Koreans while we were in the northern zone. It was only because I was able to speak in Japanese to the Koreans when I was able to escape from the watchful eyes of our guards, that we were able to get any first-hand information about conditions there.

The Soviet Army of Occupation which numbered about 250,000 had been doing garrison duty on the Manchurian border before coming to Korea. This may have helped to account for their excesses when they first arrived. Anyway, they had caused a very bad impression and the Koreans lived in a state of constant apprehension—fear of rape and murder, fear of having their livestock and crops stolen to feed the army, and fear of having their household possessions stolen by soldiers whose standard of living was evidently so low that even the few possessions in the average Korean home were greatly prized. One night when we were in Pyeng Yang we heard the screams of the Koreans when an Army truck arrived and forcibly cleared them out of house and home. When soldiers went on leave, we were told it was not an unfamiliar sight to see piles of stolen Korean furniture heaped on the station awaiting transport to the U.S.S.R.

The streets of Pyeng Yang were lined with colossal portraits of Stalin and Kim Ilsung, painted in bright colour and bearing the captions "Our Leaders". North Korea was already a Police State and all males between 16 and 60 were unable to move without a Certificate of Citizenship, to obtain which they had to make a declaration in support of the Soviet Command. Many of the best Korean schools had been taken over by the Soviet Army, and only avowed Communists among the Koreans were allowed to teach. The Russians had brought in no supplies and we found hospitals in a critical state without much needed supplies of equipment and drgs. There was no interest taken in the welfare of the Korean population, and the condition of Korean refugees from Manchuria who had been forcibly ejected by the Chinese was terrible. Life

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was so harsh for all but the faithful, and the denial of personal liberty so great, that as mentioned elsewhere upwards of 2 million of the population of North Korea escaped to the American zone.

The Russians made their usual bid for the support of the peasant farmers by their Land Reform policy. Immediately they occupied North Korea they seized all privately owned land, above a certain size whether it had belonged to Japanese landlords or to absentee Koreans, and parcelled it out in small plots. The work of distribution was said to be carried out by local "People's Committees". The title to the land was not given to the new owner, who only received a 'cultivation right' and if he did not keep in the good graces of the Party he could be evicted. The new owner had to pay 27 per cent. of his crop annually in tax and in addition was forced to sell the Government at a low price up to 50 per cent. of his crop in a "patriotic" rice collection drive.

Land Reform in South Korea.

The Russians made a big bid to gain support for their regime by the quick manner in which they implemented their land reform programme. In South Korea, on the other hand, the American Command hesitated to tackle the problem of redistribution of the land formerly owned by the Japanese, believing this to be the responsibility of the Korean Government when such was established. Eventually Military Government, realising the unwisdom of any further delay in Land Reform, and being anxious to cut the ground from under the feet of the Communist agitators before the elections were held to set up a National Assembly in May, 1948, set about selling the land to the Korean peasant farmers.

The Japanese had owned 18 per cent. of the rice land, and 8 per cent. of the dry crop land of South Korea, and the American Land Reform programme applied only to this land. Military Government hoped that the pattern set by them in the redistribution of Japanese owned land would be followed by the Korean Government in tackling the problem of large estates owned by Koreans.

Under the American plan the average land sold to each farmer was 1.1 acres and the price paid was estimated in measures of grain and was fixed at three times the annual yield, with minimum payment at $1/5$ th of the crop per year for 15 years with no interest charged. In South Korea the average farmer's family of 5.6 persons cultivates 2 acres and the redistribution changed the ratio of owners and tenants from 30 per cent. owners and 70 per cent. tenants to 55 per cent. owners and 45 per cent. tenants. Altogether the plan benefited well over 3 million persons. Some of the best

features of the American plan were that the title of the land passed to the farmer the day he signed his mortgage: that during the life of the mortgage the land cannot be seized for debts, nor can it be disposed of without the permission of the Government: re-sale is prohibited for ten years, thus giving security of tenure for this period to at least 28 per cent. of the farmers of South Korea.

Although young radical elements in the new Legislature, which was established as a result of the May election, succeeded in forcing the passage of a bill extending to all absentee-owned land, a tenant-purchase programme, it is very doubtful whether anything was done to implement it before the present conflict arose.

Korea and the United Nations.

As a result of the failure of the Joint Commission to make any progress over the unification of Korea and the establishment of a provisional government, the U.S. Government decided to bring the whole question before the United Nations. When the General Assembly met in September, 1947, it agreed to a U.S. resolution to put the Korean question on the Agenda and referred it to the First Committee for consideration and report. Three days later the Soviet delegation on the Joint Commission issued a statement in Seoul suggesting that Soviet and U.S. troops be withdrawn from Korea simultaneously early in 1948, and that the Koreans organise their own government without outside assistance. The U.S. delegation on the Joint Commission contended that such a proposal was outside the sphere of authority of the Commission whereupon the Soviet Foreign Minister sent a note to the U.S. Secretary of State charging the American delegation with responsibility for failure to form a provisional government "through hindering the re-establishment of Korea as a united democratic state".

The Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of troops was called to the attention of the General Assembly by the U.S., which submitted a draft resolution recommending that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. hold elections in their respective zones not later than March, 1948, under the observation of the U.N. "as the initial step leading to the creation of a National Assembly and the establishment of a National Government in Korea". . . The resolution further recommended that immediately upon establishment of such a government, it should organise its own security forces, take over the functions of government from the occupying powers, and arrange with the latter for the early and complete withdrawal of their armed forces from Korea. The resolution also proposed the appointment of a U.N. Temporary Commission to "travel, observe and consult throughout Korea" in order to "facilitate and expe-

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dite" the holding of free elections for representatives to a National Assembly.

The Representative of the U.S.S.R. maintained that the Korean question, like other problems connected with the Peace Treaties, did not fall within the competence of the United Nations, and added that in the opinion of the U.S.S.R., Korea could not establish its government freely until after the complete withdrawal of foreign troops. The U.S.S.R. then submitted a draft resolution to invite the elected representatives of the Korean people from northern and southern Korea to take part in the discussions in the First Committee. When this Soviet proposal was rejected by the First Committee, the U.S.S.R. Representative stated that if a U.N. Temporary Commission were to be set up after the Assembly had considered the question without the participation of Korean representatives in the discussion, the U.S.S.R. would not be able to take part in the work of the Commission.

On November 14th, 1947, two resolutions sponsored by the U.K. and U.S. were adopted by the General Assembly 43 votes to none with 6 abstentions (the Soviet bloc). The purpose of the resolutions was to enable the Korean people to obtain their independence through the holding of free elections and the establishment of a National Government with the assistance of a U.N. Temporary Commission. The Commission, which consisted of the representatives of eight countries (the Ukraine S.S.R. had been elected as the 9th member, but refused to serve), arrived in Korea in January, 1948, and made its first objective to obtain Soviet co-operation in holding the elections. Failing in this initial effort, it commenced consultations with political leaders in South Korea, where opinion was very much divided on the wisdom of holding an election to establish a National Government in only the southern zone. They feared that this would have the result of finally dividing their country. Many of these middle of the road people considered that while the Occupying Powers had failed to bring unity to Korea, it was not impossible for Korean leaders of the right and left to get together and bridge the gap. Dr. Syngman Rhee and his followers had always been in favour of holding an election on the South Zone only and the refusal of the Soviet to co-operate played right into their hands. Kim Koo and Kim Kyusic opposed the idea of the election and the latter took the lead in a movement to hold a joint political conference with the leaders of the north with a view to establishing a unified government, and accordingly addressed letters to the northern leaders. Without acknowledging Kim's letter, the Communist leaders themselves issued invitations to a "North-South Political Conference". Great capital has been

made out of this conference by the Communists. It was held in Pyeng Yang, the month before the elections were held in South Korea, and was attended by Kim Koo and Rim Kyusic. It is clear both from the manner of its calling and its proceedings, that the main purpose in holding it was not to achieve the unity of Korea but to confuse the issue of the U.N.-sponsored election in the South.

The situation in the South immediately preceding the elections was far from satisfactory. Only the parties of the extreme right were in favour of the election, and the terrorist campaign of the leftists evoked many undemocratic activities both by the rightists and the South Korean Interim Government's police force. Most of the candidates for election represented one of the two major right-wing parties—the Hankook Democratic Party, or Syngman Rhee's party—the Society for the Rapid Realisation of Korean Independence, or were independents of the extreme right.

Despite the campaign of terrorism 80 per cent. of the eligible voters registered, and 92 per cent. of these went to the polls. The official casualty list released by the Interim Government was 589 persons killed between the 29th March and 10th May when the elections were held. In addition, 10,000 "rioters" were detained by the police for questioning.

The U.N. Temporary Commission carried out a comprehensive programme of observation of the election and reported that a "reasonable degree of free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly were recognised and respected" had existed during the elections, and that their results were "a valid expression of the free will of the electorate".

Of the 171 members of the National Assembly elected, 85 were Independents, 56 belonged to Syngman Rhee's party and 30 to the closely allied Hankook Democratic Party. In the National Assembly a proportionate number of seats to the population (about 100) were reserved for the later participation of the people of the Northern Zone in the Assembly. When the National Assembly was inaugurated in July, 1948, Dr. Syngman Rhee was elected Chairman until the Constitution was adopted, when he was elected President of the new Government. According to "Korea 1945-48" published by the Department of State, the form of government established under the new Constitution was "a strong-executive form of democratic government" with the Prime Minister appointed by the President and no provision made for the dissolution of the Assembly in case of disagreement with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

On December 14th, 1948, the General Assembly received the

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report of the Temporary Commission on the elections and the establishment of the Government. The General Assembly by resolution declared "that there has been established a lawful Government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea . . . in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside . . . and that this is the only such Government in Korea".

At almost the same time that the Republic of Korea assumed authority in the southern zone, another government was brought into being in the northern zone. The newly elected Supreme People's Council in North Korea on September 9, 1948, proclaimed the establishment of a "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" claiming like the Government of the Republic of Korea, to have jurisdiction over the entire country. On September 19, 1948, the Soviet Foreign Office delivered to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow a note stating that all Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Korea by the end of December, 1948, in response to the request of the "Supreme National Assembly" in North Korea.

Withdrawal of the American Occupation Forces from South Korea was completed on the 29th June, 1949, with the exception of a Military Adviser Group of 500 which remained at the request of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

Australian Population Policy and its Relation to Asia.

W. D. Borrie.

By the introduction of the most ambitious immigration programme in Australia's history, the war-time Labour Government expressed in no uncertain terms the view that Australia requires a much larger population than is likely to accrue from the natural increase of the Australian-born parents. The aim of that policy was to achieve a constant intake of 70,000 new settlers a year so as to give Australia a total annual rate of increase of approximately 140,000, or two per cent. of the population of Australia in 1940.

A change of government in December, 1949, brought no significant change in the official policy. Indeed the new Minister for Immigration (Mr. Holt) made it clear from the outset that he would continue to build upon the foundations laid by his predecessor. The situation which greeted the new Minister in fact called for optimism; for after a slow start in 1946 the immigration programme gathered speed so quickly that in 1949 almost 150,000 new settlers, or double the original target figure, arrived in Australia. Further, there were still reported to be upward of 400,000 people waiting in the United Kingdom for passages to Australia, and as the shipping position was improved it was hoped that the number of British migrants could be increased. To offset the reduction which would occur in the pool of European Displaced Persons as the International Refugee Organisation tapered off its activities in 1951, plans were also being prepared early in 1950 to extend the search for migrants among the permanent citizens of a wide range of European countries. The success of the 1949 immigration, and the rate in inflow early in 1950 encouraged the Government to increase the "target" figure to 200,000 a year.

There is little evidence so far that the total migrant pool in the United Kingdom and Europe will be reduced in the near future, although emphasis may shift increasingly from Europe to Britain. If European recovery continues to follow an upward curve there may be some weakening of the economic incentive to emigrate, but this appears to have been more than offset by the psychological reaction to the uncertain international situation. Public opinion

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polls continue to show that hundreds of thousands of young persons will flee the Old World if they are given the opportunity.

Thus it would appear that the potential migratory movement from Britain and Europe is still much in excess of the level predicted by pre-war writers who spoke of "the drying-up of the migrant reservoirs". Given a stable international situation and an end to the "Cold War", and the continued improvement in the British and European economic situation, the potential flow may be reduced considerably in the near future. But the certain fact is that it is still there: and the Australian government is making every endeavour to take advantage of that fact.

Can Australia continue to absorb settlers at recent rates? The question is difficult to answer because of the uncertainties of the international, as well as of the internal, economic situation. At the moment it appears probable that immigrants can be absorbed into the Australian economy at the rate of 150,000 a year or more. Recent surveys have shown that there is a shortage of up to 100,000 workers in Australia. The flow of immigrants in recent years has not eliminated this dearth, but it has altered its direction. It is for the production of capital goods, rather than consumer goods, that labour is now urgently required in this country. This manpower shortage is fundamentally the result of a number of factors —e.g. the industrial impetus given to the Australian economy during the war; the manufacture of a wide range of industrial equipment which pre-war was imported from abroad; the lag in capital equipment as a result of the concentration of manpower during the war in the armed services and munitions industries. There has, in short, been a minor industrial revolution in Australia in the last decade, as can be seen from the census figures in 1933 and 1947. In this intercensal period those engaged in manufacturing increased by 63 per cent. compared with an increase in the total male bread-winning population of only 14 per cent.

The maintenance of an immigration programme at present levels will become increasingly difficult for any long period. The "target" of 200,000 a year is almost certainly too high as a long-term objective. For one thing, while the demographic composition of the Australian population is at the moment extremely favourable to the intake of a large quantity of new settlers into the labour force, this situation is likely to be altered quite suddenly in the near future. At the moment the Australian-born population entering the labour market represents the survivors of the babies born during the years of economic depression in the nineteen-thirties, when the birth rate dropped to a record low level. Further, those retiring from the

upper age-limits of the working population have been above the average in recent years. Both factors have tended to keep the Australian-born "work-force" at a comparatively stationary level at the moment when the demand for labour has been at a maximum. But within ten years the greatly expanded cohorts of babies born during the last decade will begin to enter the labour market. (In 1949 the birth rate was almost 50 per cent. higher than in 1934.)

Other problems are also likely to arise. As the lag in the renewal and expansion of capital equipment, emanating from the economic dislocation of the war years, is made good, and as technical efficiency increases through mechanisation the demand for labour may ultimately be reduced. The intake of immigrants may also have to be reduced unless they can be recruited with the skills—and indeed with the lack of skills—necessary to put them to work in trades which will increase the stock of capital of the country. For example, some migrants will have to build houses for the new settlers, if a problem which is already acute is to be overcome. But many will be required to do much of the manual labour associated with heavy extractive industries and with such constructional projects as the Snowy River scheme—labour which the Australian work-force, conditioned by the atmosphere of a sellers' market, will avoid as far as possible. Unless the immigration programme can be matched by a commensurate increase in Australia's productive potential (and this may mean substantial overseas borrowing for the purchase of capital equipment) immigration may increase inflationary pressure to a dangerous degree.

Despite these difficulties, however, the absorptive capacity of Australia is probably greater today than ever before, and as great in proportion to the total population as any other country. But it is also clear that in the near future Australia will be able to secure all the immigrants which can be absorbed from the traditional sources of the British Isles and Europe.

Does this then mean that there need be no re-orientation in the Australian immigration policy? Certainly it still remains true that immigration from the traditional sources will provide settlers who can most readily be absorbed, economically, politically and culturally. First, it must be stressed that the economic expansion of Australia in recent years has not been the result of agricultural or pastoral development, but of more intense industrial activity. For too long too many Australians have accepted the view that the peak has been reached in the development of their country's primary resources. It is probable that scientific investigation will re-

veal that there are sources, for example in Northern Queensland and in the Northern Territory, which can be utilised more efficiently, or which simply have not been utilised at all. But present knowledge does not suggest that these are either extensive enough or rich enough to make any significant difference to the carrying capacity of Australia. Further, their efficient development may mean rather large-scale development of a highly technical character than intensive settlement. The expansion of Australia's population must continue to come in the near future, as it has in the past, from the more intensive development of primary resources and the expansion of secondary industries in areas already settled.

Second, while Australia is geographically a Pacific country, it is still part of a western civilization, with political and cultural roots still closely related to the group of islands from which over ninety per cent. of its people have sprung. Only in the geographical sense can Australia be called an *Eastern* country. Further, the Australian people have attained a high material standard of living—be it admitted more through a long series of fortuitous circumstances than through any unique hereditary trait. But the cause of this development is of less relevance here than the fact that it has occurred. It is this primarily which determines the type of migrant who can be readily assimilated, and which has determined and which is likely to go on determining the attitude of governments towards a selective immigration policy. Any government which attempted to introduce immigrants in quantities which would threaten Australian labour standards would be overwhelmed by the strength of organised labour.

This should not be interpreted to mean that Australians—the rank and file as well as the leaders—have not a deep sympathy with the peoples of Asia in their struggle for political independence and improved material conditions of life. The events of the last war have forced upon most people a realisation of the extent to which Australia's security is inextricably associated with the peoples of south-eastern Asia. Post-war events have revealed the extent to which Australians will lend support to movements for independence within the framework of a political democracy. Yet the overwhelming numerical preponderance of the Asiatic races does tend to create a fear-complex amongst many Australians—this, of course, not without reason, as the history of Japanese aggression shows. There is likely to remain in Australia sympathetic support for independence and democratic development in Asia, but at the same time a determination to increase the industrial and man-power strength of the country to give it the power to resist

aggression amongst its near-neighbours. Herein lies an important part of the explanation of the rigour with which the post-war immigration policy is being executed.

The complex motives which lie behind the Australian immigration policy have at times tended to encourage the proponents of population expansion to let emotion get the better of their reason. It has long been claimed that the immigrant restriction legislation of Australia aims at the protection of labour standards, and not at exclusion on racial grounds. Basically this is true, although the machinery of control has been such as to injure the susceptibilities of many non-white people. Just what other form of control could have been applied it is difficult to see. For example, the homogeneity of the population would have made—and still makes—the application of a quota law similar to that of U.S.A. very difficult to operate.

There have been times, however, when the fear of the numerical preponderance of Asia, coupled with the fear of the spread to these shores of a totalitarian ideology, has caused public leaders to speak and act in a manner which renders it virtually impossible for a national of Indonesia, Malaya or the Philippines not to feel that the dominant purpose of the Australian immigration policy is not the protection of living standards but exclusion specifically on racial grounds. While it remains true that the majority of Australians (judged from public opinion polls) still believe that a selective migration policy should be maintained, it should be emphasised that there was much opposition to the rigid application of the law in the case of numerous war-time Asiatic refugees in Australia.

The reasonableness of the principle of preventing the accumulation of unassimilable ethnic minorities, either on political, cultural or economic grounds, has been admitted by some leaders of Asiatic countries themselves, as at the Pan-Asian conference held at New Delhi in 1947. The statement of the principle is the easiest part of the problem: to establish a method which will allow the principle to be equitably applied is much more difficult. The method used by Australia has frequently been criticised, and considerable support for an attempt to alter the method to meet the legitimate rights of Asiatic countries as independent nations would probably be found today amongst intellectual and political leaders in Australia. The method of the right to exclude by the application of a language test followed the pattern of legislation in other parts of the British Empire, as it then was. Further, the colonial or semi-colonial status of much of Asia meant that Australia had to satisfy the controlling powers rather than the governed. Now it is a ques-

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tion of dealing direct with independent nations conscious of their rights.

It may still be questioned, however, whether the principle can or should be given up in the interests of either white or non-white peoples. While the economic gulf remains so wide between the economic standards of western European countries and "white" countries of the New World on the one hand, and most of Asia on the other, the free intermingling of peoples would do more to exacerbate relations than to harmonise them.

Finally, there remains the major question whether migration control amongst western countries such as Australia is preventing the solution of the problem which is likely to rank above all others in the struggle of many Asiatic countries for economic independence—overpopulation.

The reports of such official bodies as the Food and Agriculture Organisation, and the many books which have appeared in recent years with the thesis that the world's population is tending to grow more rapidly than its food supply, have helped to increase western awareness of this problem. But it may be questioned whether the majority of Australians are aware of the real nature of the problem in Asia. Further, the statements of some well-wishers of Japan that the only solution to the pressure of numbers against resources is the emigration of surplus Japanese to such areas as New Guinea tends to put Australians on the defensive. They remember that New Guinea was the area in which bloody battles were fought to save Australia from Japanese aggression.

It is sometimes forgotten that pre-war Japan overcame to some extent its problem of overpopulation, not so much by emigration, as by economic efficiency. The same result might have ensued from industrialisation plus peaceful trade negotiations instead of from industrialisation plus imperial aggression. What is certain is that emigration would not have eased Japan's population problem unless it had been accompanied by industrial expansion within Japan and birth control.

The moral which suggests itself to thoughtful Australians from the Japanese experiences is that the only attack upon the population of Asia which is likely to achieve any substantial measure of success is industrial development, which must proceed at a more rapid pace than the rate of population growth. That the problem is of much greater magnitude and complexity than any which western peoples had to solve is obvious, but just because of this the attack upon it has now to be made more by the increased availability of resources through a reasonable system of international trade than by the mass movement of people. To

seek a solution first through mass migration before steps have been taken to improve agricultural and industrial efficiency is to attack the problem from the wrong end. Such a policy would merely bring into operation the Malthusian law of pressure of numbers against subsistence.

This assessment of the population problem of Asia does not mean that Australia and other "white" countries of the Pacific are trying to evade their responsibilities in the matter. It does imply, however, that a population policy which aims at increasing the economic efficiency of Australia may be justified on the grounds that it will bring into production resources which will increase the stock of goods and services available to heavily overpopulated areas. The introduction of subsistence farming in Australia, for example, would tend to reduce the surplus of foodstuffs available for export; but the stock of primary products available for export may be increased through a policy of scientific agriculture which aims to increase output per man hour and yields per acre. Similarly, the maximum contribution which Australia can make to the improved economic efficiency of Asia may be through the efficient development of heavy industry and the increased export of machinery and equipment which can be used to improve agricultural efficiency in Asia.

Economic expansion in Australia along these lines presupposes a selective migration policy to see that the new settlers have the necessary skills and that they are introduced in the right proportion. And as we have stated above, there is no indication that a sufficient supply of such settlers cannot be secured from the traditional sources of emigration. The method adopted to give effect to such a policy must, in the opinion of the writer, avoid as far as humanly possible any discrimination on a racial basis, although it must also take into account the assimilability of the immigrants on cultural as well as economic grounds.

To attempt to carry the discussion at this stage beyond this rather bald statement of principle would serve no good purpose, and indeed would be difficult. The freeing of much of Asia from imperial control and the nature of the demographic problems that are likely to arise from the developmental plans of independent Asiatic countries has raised issues of such complexity and such magnitude that no simple solution can be offered. A strong case may be stated, however, for an international conference of both white and non-white countries in the South East Asian and Pacific zones to discuss the demographic implications of current and proposed economic policies. Particularly important at this stage is inter-

national discussion upon migration, which is the immediate issue likely to cause tension. At such a conference it would be natural to expect each independent nation to present its case in relation, not merely to its immediate demographic problem, but also to its aim of national security, to any obligations it may have as a trusteeship power owing responsibilities to the United Nations, and to its attitude to the major ideological clash which now separates Communist and non-Communist sections of the world.

In such a discussion Australia's attitude would be determined by a number of important facts. First, there is the fact, already referred to, that Australia has launched a migration scheme which is designed to continue to provide a rate of population increase equal to the maximum absorptive capacity of the country. A study of secular trends has shown that few countries have maintained a rate of increase of more than 2 per cent. per annum over any long period. At the moment the rate of increase in Australia, through the balance of births over deaths and net immigration, is nearer 3 per cent. Second, there is the fact that Australia must now co-operate with Asiatic peoples who have won independence and who are entitled in the councils of the world to the same rights as the erstwhile imperial powers. Third, there is the fact that Australia, after the experience of 1941-45, and the vast change that has occurred in the balance of power in South East Asia and the Pacific, feels that it must establish its security and fulfil its obligations to the coloured peoples over whom it has a trust. Finally, there is the fact that Australia is a political democracy prepared to support the development of independent democratic regimes in Asia and the Pacific zones, but determined to resist the spread of totalitarianism which may endanger its own security.

To these facts may be added the opinion, which is held by a majority of "western students" of demographic problems, that the solution of the problem of overpopulation in Asia is not to be found through emigration, which alone could do no more—even if conducted on a vast scale—than provide temporary relief of the pressure of numbers against subsistence; but through the efficient utilisation of the resources in Asia and the increased availability of resources from outside Asia. Only if emigration is accompanied by controlled fertility will this thesis be invalidated. Quite another matter is the reasonable right of all free people to oppose the closing of doors against them on the grounds of race alone. But the question has still to be asked whether an open door policy in a world in which there are such wide economic, cultural and religious gulf will not create more problems than it will solve.

The European Payments Union.

R. H. Scott.*

For the greater part of a decade now officialdom has spoken with two voices. It has protested the virtue of multi-lateral trade and made bi-lateral trade and payments arrangements. The Bretton Woods Agreement which established the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the proposals for an International Trade Organisation were designed to sweep away the major institutional impediments to world trade and payments, to make the world one trading area instead of a complex and tangled picture of nation to nation agreements. Yet world trade in the post-war period has been conducted upon the very bilateral basis which these agreements sought to avoid.

The paradox did not arise from any vice of officialdom but from the absence of the underlying conditions essential for multi-lateral trade. Now, however, those European countries which have been aided by the European Recovery Programme, the E.R.P., have adopted a payments mechanism which introduces the principle of multi-lateralism.

On 7th July, 1950, the Council of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the O.E.E.C., announced that it had reached agreement upon the form of a European Payments Union to which its members, in all eighteen countries, mainly of Western Europe, were expected to subscribe.¹ In a world of nomenclature by initials, the Union is already referred to as E.P.U.

To attempt to forecast the trend of trade and payments among European countries which will result from the operations of the Union would be rash. To describe the events leading to its formation, and the manner in which it will operate, is complex enough.

The primary purpose of E.P.U. is to provide a mechanism by which payments can be made for imports from fellow-members in a way which will contribute to an expansion of their mutual trade.

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the institution by which he is employed.

1. At the time of writing in August, 1950, Switzerland had not confirmed its stated intention of becoming an effective member of the E.P.U.

At the close of hostilities in 1945 Europe was faced with the task of rebuilding its industries and restoring its trade to a level which would sustain a healthy economy. Had it been left alone with its problems it would have suffered acute hardship. Fortunately the U.S. came to its aid, but only on condition that Europe should also help itself. This self help was to come through the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.

One of the problems which faced the Organisation on its formation, and still faces it, was the restoration of trade between its members. Trade connections had been lost, production in every field was inadequate to meet needs and in nearly every country international reserves were already or quickly became seriously depleted. Even before the war, nationalistic policies had encouraged the use of bilateral payments arrangements and the difficulties of the post-war period led to an intensification of this trend.

The new political alignments which followed the war added to the difficulties already caused by destruction and dislocation. In particular, the division of Germany between East and West destroyed the key place which Germany had occupied before the war in intra-European trade.

Nevertheless, production recovered at an encouraging rate. It was trade that was slow to revive. Even within Europe itself individual countries were still limiting their imports from one to another to the value of their exports, seeking a balance in trade and payments with each of their trading partners. Sterling, which before the war had served as an international currency, was, apart from the brief period before the convertibility crisis of 1947, no longer either convertible or transferable except within a limited area.

The result was that, in many cases, commodities urgently needed in one country could not be bought even though they were available and at times in surplus in another.

During the first months of the provision of Marshall Aid, U.S. dollars were made available for purchases within Europe itself. But the United States Economic Co-operation Administration, responsible for the handling of Marshall Aid, never regarded this arrangement with any satisfaction.

An attempt to overcome payments difficulties as between themselves was made by Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands in 1947. In 1948, the arrangement was amended and enlarged to form the basis of the Intra-European Payments Agreement of that year, and E.C.A. discontinued the practice of making dollars available for purchases within Europe. Payments arrangements were, how-

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ever, still bilateral. The countries adhering to the Agreement, nearly all the members of O.E.E.C., entered into a series of bilateral negotiations to arrive at an agreed forecast of their balances of payments with one another for the ensuing twelve months; on the basis of these forecasts, each country established or received a drawing right in favour of or from its trading partners and these drawing rights were then used in the settlement of their debts to one another. The Agreement was made attractive by the provision of dollars under Marshall Aid to the extent that drawing rights were granted.

The 1948 Agreement expired at the end of June, 1949, and was renewed for a further twelve months with one important modification of principle; twenty-five per cent. of the drawing rights were to be provided on a multilateral basis, that is to say, each country could use twenty-five per cent. of its drawing rights upon another to discharge a debt to any third country being a party to the Agreement.

It is difficult to estimate what part of the subsequent increase in trade was directly attributable to the operation of the Intra-European Payments Agreement, but during 1949 intra-European trade increased by as much as 50 per cent.

It was recognised before the year was out, however, that the Intra-European Payments Agreement was deficient in several important respects. In the first place, it tended to perpetuate a bilateral pattern of trade. Moreover, forecasting of bilateral balances proved, in the event, to be inaccurate; France, during 1949/50, used none of the £stg.120 million drawing rights established by the United Kingdom in her favour. And, whilst their debts were covered by grants from other countries, the Agreement gave no incentive to debtors to improve their position.

Negotiations for a new arrangement were opened some months before the current agreement was due to expire, at the end of June, 1950. The conditions which the new arrangement should fulfil were early recognised. It was to be a major step forward in European co-operation. Not only was it to assist in fulfilment of the wider aim of enabling Europe to pay its way but it was to provide a payments machinery which could operate after the European Recovery Programme came to an end in 1952 and which would serve the needs of a European trading area free from quantitative trade and exchange restrictions; and it was to operate in such a fashion that it would ease the strain upon depleted international reserves during the transition from the E.R.P. to the post-E.R.P. period.

Within the framework of these broad directives, E.P.U. was to

conform to other and more specific conditions. Members' currencies were to be completely transferrable within the group; that is to say, each country was to be able to use any other member's currency which it had earned in order to settle a current debt with a third member. At the same time, the scheme was to offer incentives to the removal of disequilibrium from members' trade with one another; specifically, it was to discourage debtors from running too heavily into debt and creditors from having large surpluses.

These provisions constituted a major change from the conditions of the Intra-European Payments Agreements. They were, of course, specifically designed to meet the objection to the earlier arrangements that they offered no encouragement to the removal of disequilibrium. But they were also designed to overcome the rigidity which those arrangements gave to the bilateral structure of trade and to place payments within Europe on a multilateral basis in conformity with the post-war aim of eventually achieving a worldwide system of multilateral payments and abolishing quantitative trade and exchange restrictions.

But before these principles could be embodied in a detailed and concrete form, some months were spent in complex and protracted negotiations which, in the differences of opinion they drew forth, reflected two differing economic philosophies. There was, on the one hand, an insistence that the "forces of the market" should be allowed to operate almost untrammeled and, on the other hand, a desire to mitigate their rigours. Belgium appeared as the main protagonist in the "market forces" camp and the United Kingdom as the champion of the opposition. The United Kingdom was, at the same time, concerned to preserve the status of sterling as an international currency.

More specifically, the Belgian school wanted to place a narrow limit upon any credit which members of the Union might be bound to extend and to have the remainder of intra-European surpluses and deficits settled by gold payments; concurrently, the Belgians wished to have the new arrangements supplant existing bilateral agreements. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, wanted the credit facilities to be more liberal and to postpone the point at which gold payments should be introduced. And, in addition, the United Kingdom wished to preserve the payments structure it had erected with a series of bilateral agreements; large balances were being held in sterling by some continental European countries which the United Kingdom feared it might be compelled to freeze in order to avoid gold losses under the Belgian proposals, thereby seriously impairing the use of sterling as an international currency.

The United States Economic Co-operation Administration took an active part in the negotiations; apart from its practical advantages, E.C.A. placed particular importance upon formation of the Union as a symbol of European integration, a cardinal point in most pre-war American thinking.

In the form which it finally took, the agreement represented a compromise between the opposing views of Belgium and the United Kingdom with E.C.A. stepping in to bridge the gap left between the points from which neither protagonist would move his stand. E.C.A. guaranteed to reimburse the United Kingdom for certain gold losses which it might suffer as a result of the Agreement, and the United Kingdom agreed to participate in the Union as a full and ordinary member. Gold payments were to be less onerous than had been proposed by Belgium; but Belgium would not be required to provide credit facilities to the same extent in proportion to her trade as other members.

That the scheme should be multilateral in its operation remained unchanged. It was agreed that members' currencies would be made freely available for payments within the Union. At the end of each month² the central banks of the member countries would submit to the Union the amounts appearing in their books on account of current transactions with each other. The Union, or rather, in this case, its Agent the Bank for International Settlements, was then to offset members' debts against one another; in effect, the offsetting of debts amounts to a simple adding of each members' debits and credits, taking into account plus and minus signs, so that there is established a net debit or credit balance with the Union for each member,³ expressed in a common unit of account currently equivalent in terms of gold to U.S. \$1.

How multilateral offsetting achieves its significance now becomes clear; for it is apparent that, because of the adoption of this mechanism, each member of E.P.U. may concentrate attention upon its balance of payments with all other members as a whole instead of with each individually. It does not matter, for instance, if the United Kingdom is in deficit with Belgium provided she is in greater credit with all other members; and it will be readily seen that no distinction need be made between individual currencies—all may be treated as equally "soft" or "hard".

There still remains, however, the method of settling net balances. The settlement would place too severe a strain upon the reserves of individual countries were they left to draw upon their own

2. At two monthly intervals during the first six months of the Union's operation.

3. In addition to net balances at each settlement will also be added to establish cumulative net debit or credit balances.

resources. It was necessary then that through E.P.U. there should be found a way of providing debtors with an opportunity to obtain the currencies they needed to meet reasonable deficits, remembering that at the same time it had been laid down that debtors must be discouraged from incurring excessive debts. But if debtors were to receive assistance, creditors must be given some chance of using their surpluses; nor should they be called upon to provide unlimited credit.

It was agreed, then, that net debts should be settled by a mixed use of credit facilities and gold payments. Debtors would receive credit from the Union to cover part of their debts and pay gold to the Union for the remainder; creditors would extend credit to the Union or part of their surpluses and receive gold from the Union for the remainder. However, there was to be a limit to the use of credit and gold; this was set by allotting each member a quota and fixing the proportion of credit to gold to be used as each quota was expended. With two exceptions, members' quotas were fixed at 15 per cent. of their current transactions with one another in 1949 and the proportion of credit to gold at 3 to 2. Belgium's quota was adjusted downward so that the burden of the credit she would extend would not bear too heavily in proportion to her national income; and Switzerland's quota was adjusted upwards because of her record of surpluses. The first 20 per cent. of each quota was to consist entirely of credit; thereafter creditors would receive one-half in gold and one-half in a credit with the Union; debtors were to pay partly in gold on a rising scale.⁴

Although payments arrangements were thus placed on a multi-lateral basis, it was agreed that existing bilateral agreements should be retained. This provision had two sides to it. It preserved what in fact had been found to be a workable, if imperfect, method of conducting international trade so that a void would not be left were E.P.U. to be liquidated; and it made possible the continued use of national currencies, in particular of sterling, in international clearing settlements. For, instead of using the credit facilities available within the Union, it was agreed that members could make use of any credit margins established in their favour under a bilateral agreements. Consequently, a country having a surplus in trade and payments with the United Kingdom could hold its balance in sterling instead of in units of account in the books of the Union.⁵

4. Gold payments were to rise from 4 per cent. of a quota in the second 20 per cent of the quota used, to 16 per cent. in the last 20 per cent. and credit facilities were to cover 16 per cent. in the second 20 per cent. used of the quota and 4 per cent. in the last 20 per cent.
5. Its right to receive gold and the United Kingdom's obligation to pay gold would not, however be effected, the use of bilateral credit margins counting as a use of units of account in the calculation of gold payments due.

It was felt, however, that no agreement could be effective which opened under the shadow of the burden of debts already outstanding between members. It was laid down, therefore, that members should enter into bilateral negotiations for the funding of any debts outstanding between them at 30th June, 1950, and that resulting repayments should count as current transactions in the periodic settlements made through the Union. But it was also agreed that if the countries concerned had no objection an outstanding debt could be used by the member to whom it was owed to settle a net deficit with the Union. Once again, this alternative to the use of the Unions credit facilities was not to detract from an obligation to make a gold payment.

The sterling balances of members of E.P.U. amounted to about £stg.200 million on 30th June, 1950, and the United Kingdom has stated its willingness to have any of these balances used to settle a net deficit. But the United Kingdom is not threatened with any depletion of its gold reserves for E.C.A. has guaranteed to reimburse any loss of gold resulting from the drawing down of sterling balances existing at the time of commencement of the Union's operations.

To an already complex payments mechanism, one further complication was added. It could be foretold with reasonable accuracy that some countries would be consistent creditors and others debtors; and that it would be necessary to give additional assistance to the debtors which could be best supplied by the prospective creditors. This was to be done by establishing, for the debtors, initial credits in the books of the Union and, for the creditors, initial debits. This meant, simply, that the creditors made grants to the Union outside their quotas and that the debtors received grants also outside their quotas for which they did not have to pay gold.

E.P.U. started operations on 1st July, 1950, with a working capital of nearly 400 million U.S. dollars, provided by E.C.A. It is intended to operate for as long as it remains the only means of multilateral settlement of members' intra-European debts, but the financial commitments were made binding only for two years. It may be liquidated at any time after 30th June, 1952, if members with combined quotas exceeding half the total withdraw or do not renew their financial commitments.

This freeing of payments arrangements from the restrictions of bilateral balancing is but a step towards the wider aim of expanding intra-European trade. Quantitative import restrictions still remain. Late in 1949 the members of O.E.E.C. had agreed to remove

restrictions from 50 per cent. of their imports from one another on private account. Later, it was agreed to extend the percentage to 60 upon completion of a satisfactory payments agreement and to consider what further measures would be necessary to secure a 75 per cent. liberalisation of trade by the end of 1950.

The prospect of payments becoming multilateral through E.P.U. removed the need for discrimination amongst members on balance of payments ground. The E.P.U. Agreement, therefore, expressly enjoins members to end discrimination on balance of payments grounds as they ease their import restrictions; and discrimination on any grounds is to be abolished by 1st January, 1951, within the field of that percentage of imports which members agree is to be free from restrictions.⁶

Two exceptions were made to the principle of non-discrimination; members were allowed to discriminate against creditors using more than 75 per cent. of their quotas and in favour of debtors whose reserves were falling at a dangerous rate.

E.P.U. has certain implications for the sterling area in general and for Australia in particular as the United Kingdom participates not only on its own account but also on behalf of the sterling area. In the first place, the sterling area need no longer discriminate amongst members of E.P.U. in the administration of import controls; consequently, those European currencies which were so "hard" during the post-war period are no longer treated differently from other European currencies and the way has been opened to expand trade, particularly with Belgium and Switzerland. This does not mean the removal of control over imports from those countries but it does mean that restrictions can be relaxed.

Moreover, the units of account of the E.P.U. will not supplant sterling as an international currency. Sterling will not be as strong as the United Kingdom had hoped to make it, but it may still be used in intra-European settlements, and no damage has been done to its wider international status. As the use of sterling is widened through the extension of the United Kingdom's system of transferable accounts, so will its status grow in importance.

E.P.U. has had some criticism levelled at it; in the United States considerable dissatisfaction has been expressed in some quarters, mainly by the financial staff of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board and the International Monetary Fund. Voicing the opposition, the National Advisory Council protested that E.C.A. in championing the Union in the form it took, had exceeded the policy directives given it earlier in the year.

6. Invisible payments were also to be subject to the principle of non-discrimination.

The opposition was based mainly upon the contention that E.P.U. provided "swing margins" that were far too wide; that gold payments were not introduced early enough nor did they rise fast enough to prevent debtor countries continuing to live beyond their means. Moreover, it was said that whilst large credits continued to be made available for the financing of deficits, creditor countries would still be subject to severe inflationary pressure.

The ultimate goal towards which Europe must strive before its currency difficulties within itself and with the rest of the world could be overcome was the restoration of convertibility of all currencies. Before this could be achieved, claimed the National Advisory Council, there must be a general deflationary shakedown within Europe.

Not all of these objections can be considered valid. The restoration of convertibility, the free exchange of one currency for any other, depends as much upon United States action to maintain a flow of dollars to the rest of the world as it does upon anything that Europe can do; and even in 1949, deflationary tendencies were evident in some European countries.

However, E.P.U. constitutes the first break in the post-war front of approaching trade problems on a world basis; it is the first major post-war economic international agreement outside the Soviet sphere of influence which puts the solution of a regional problem first.

There is some fear in America that the removal of restrictions within a closed circle of some eighteen European countries will create a trading area from which United States goods may eventually be excluded or at least to which their entry may be severely limited.

It is only some historian of the future who will be able to gauge the full significance of E.P.U. But it is in the context of the wider field of the part it will play in raising the level of world trade that E.P.U. must be judged, not only by the contribution it makes to the freeing of trade within Europe itself.

The Suva Conference of South Pacific Peoples

Nancy Robson.

The courageous initiative of the founders of the South Pacific Commission in establishing the principle of a conference of native peoples of the area was successfully brought to fruit in April of this year. Delegates of sixteen territories, administered under the flags of six different Powers and including also two royal representatives of the independent kingdom of Tonga, gathered together in Suva for a fortnight of official meetings and lively informal contacts. The Conference was carried through by the Commission Secretariat and chaired by H.E. the Governor of Fiji, Sir Brian Freeston, with a smoothness that allayed the misgivings of the uneasy, and in an atmosphere of cordiality that made the notion of a South Pacific synthesis seem more for the moment than a mere visionary dream.

The South Pacific Commission is an international body grouping representatives of the six Powers having dependencies in the South Pacific region: Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. In the founding Agreement, signed *ad referendum* in Canberra in February, 1947, and ratified eighteen months later, its territorial scope is defined as those non-self-governing territories in the Pacific Ocean which are administered by the participating Governments and which lie wholly or in part south of the equator and east from and including Netherlands New Guinea. Its role is to advise the Governments concerned on measures for improving the social and economic welfare of the inhabitants of the territories. Essential to this task is its auxiliary, the South Pacific Research Council, set up within the terms of the Agreement and divided into the three fields of Health and Social and Economic Development. The Commission has no organic ties with the United Nations Organisation, although it maintains informal—probably soon to be formal—relations with some of the Specialised Agencies such as the World Health Organisation, the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council of the Food and Agricultural Organisation, and U.N.E.S.C.O.

The South Pacific Conference of native peoples is provided for in paragraphs 27-38 of the Agreement. "In order to associate with the work of the Commission representatives of the local inhabitants of, and of official and non-official institutions directly concerned with the territories within the scope of the Commission, there shall be established a South Pacific Conference with advisory powers as a body auxiliary to the Commission." The Conference is to meet at intervals not exceeding three years, in one or other of the Commission territories, with due regard to the principle of rotation. It is empowered to discuss such matters of common interest as fall within the competence of the Commission, and to make recommendations upon them to the Commission. Agenda and rules of procedure for each meeting are adopted after preliminary approval by the Commission in session. The Conference may, however, make recommendations as to procedure at its meetings, and may propose items for inclusion in the agenda.

Territories designated by the Commission to send delegates to the first South Pacific Conference were the following: Papua, the Trust Territory of New Guinea, and Nauru, under Australian administration; New Caledonia with its dependencies, and French Oceania, under France; Netherlands New Guinea; Western Samoa, the Tokelaus, and the Cook Islands, including Niue, administered by New Zealand; under the United Kingdom Fiji, the Ellice Islands and the Gilberts, and the British Solomon Islands Protectorate; American Samoa; and the Franco-British condominium of the New Hebrides. Two delegates were invited from each of these territories, with the exception of Nauru and the Tokelaus, which sent one each; and alternates and advisers varying between two and four. An invitation to send two delegates and two advisers was addressed also to the Government of Tonga. The Agreement had laid down the principle that delegates should "be selected in such a manner as to ensure the greatest possible measure of representation to the local inhabitants of the territory".

The Agenda adopted for the conference with the agreement of Member Governments listed the following topics: Mosquito Control and the Healthy Village, in the domain of Public Health; The Village School, Vocational Training and Co-operative Societies, in the field of Social Development; Fisheries Methods and the Improvement and Diversification of Food and Export Crops, in the economic sphere. An introductory paper on each topic was to be prepared beforehand on the responsibility of one of the Member Governments and presented by a delegate as a mechanism for launching the discussion. (The Commission's intention to circulate

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these background papers for study by delegations before the conference was for the most part frustrated in the event by their last-minute appearance.) Australia undertook to introduce the topics of Mosquito Control and The Improvement and Diversification of Food and Export Crops; France was charged with Fisheries Methods and the Netherlands with Vocational Training; New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States prepared The Village School, Co-operatives, and The Healthy Village respectively.

Delegations began to arrive in Suva a few days before the Conference was due to open, on April 25th. Delegates and their advisers were housed in the verdant setting of the Teachers' Training College at Nasinu, a few miles south of Suva, which the Fiji Administration had made available with the intention of enabling delegates to mix as freely as possible in their unofficial hours. The Assembly Hall of the College was set aside for plenary meetings, and meals were served in the refectory by smiling Fijian teachers-in-training. Persons attending the Conference other than delegates and advisers—observers included most Commissioners, and representatives of the United Nations Secretariat, the World Health Organisation, the Pacific Science Board, the Caribbean Commission, and various missionary organisations—stayed for the most part at hotels in Suva and travelled out daily for the meetings. The Western Samoan delegation also preferred to stay in Suva, rather than to mingle with other delegations in the free and easy atmosphere of Nasinu.

Most striking feature of the native representation was the vast gap separating eastern and western Pacific. Between the fluency and mental independence displayed in discussions by the hereditary princes of Polynesia, and the contributions, by comparison infinitely laboured and derivative, of Melanesians only just emerging from the horizon-bounded village community, yawned a gulf which the Melanesians themselves recognised with an emphatic and disarming humility, and with, at the same time, what seemed an awakening realisation of possibilities within themselves. Perhaps the most significant achievement of the Conference was in this revelation of the east to the west.

It was inevitable that the quality of discussion should be uneven, with delegates representing territories so widely divergent in culture and development. The diversity of languages was largely overcome by the fact that most delegates spoke in English—with accents ranging suggestively from Oxford through the States to the unmistakable Australian of the New Guineas. Representatives of the French and Dutch territories spoke through interpreters.

In any case it was to be borne in mind that none of the delegates (except one metropolitan Frenchman, sent rather surprisingly as a delegate from Tahiti) had the advantage of speaking in his native tongue. It was perhaps for this reason that the background and education of the Pacific islander in oratory as art and prestige did not lead, as was expected by some, to the characteristic island conclave stretching resourcefully and interminably onward into time. The rule of procedure limiting speeches to ten minutes per delegation had on the contrary to be set aside in the first few days until delegates had conquered their strangeness and begun to speak more freely. (For the next Conference the time has been extended to fifteen minutes.) In general, the discussion of agenda items took the rather disappointing form of the presentation of the introductory paper, followed by a statement from a member of each delegation regarding the situation in his territory. A day was spent on each agenda item, and an *ad hoc* drafting committee met at the close of the discussion to formulate resolutions seeming to emerge from it or proposed by delegates. These were rapidly ratified at the next meeting. The discussion thus never reached the point of lively give and take, and could in most cases hardly be called a discussion in the true sense. Of the resolutions adopted, only a few might be said to represent a demand consciously emanating from the Conference as a whole.

Representatives seemed in most cases to be well chosen, and all displayed a genuine serious interest in the Conference's work. Certain personalities naturally stood out among them, and swiftly gained a considerable personal ascendancy. Prince Tungi, of Tonga, far exceeded all others in the sensible practicality of his suggestions, for the most part simple proposals aimed at dealing with specific and manageable problems. Cook Islands contributions, in speeches read by the only woman delegate, the Rarotongan Makea Ariki, were also for the most part outstanding for their relevance and sound sense. Of the two Western Samoan Fautua, Tamasese alone spoke in sessions; like Tungi, he was distinguished by his utterance and the independence of his thinking, as well as by the charm and prestige of his personality. (Both men have also the chiefly attribute of enormous oak-like solidity and size.) Tamasese, however, tended to be disappointing in his conclusions. A Samoan prince of the blood, the acknowledged leader of his people, endowed by the New Zealand Administration with important governmental functions and revered by Samoans to a degree forever unattainable by the western official, should not describe in detail the filth of Samoan villages, the uncut undergrowth, the insanitary practices, the inevitable multiplication of disease, without betraying any trace of

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a consciousness of his own responsibility, or any sense that some of the remedy lies in the hands of the Samoan himself. Whereas, with the status he had acquired in the eyes of delegates from all over the South Pacific, Tamasese could have played a significant role in pointing the way for native leaders to go back among their people as the indispensable leaven, to inspire the raising of standards that can only result from the social awakening of the people themselves, his factual account of conditions, with its implied laying of all blame at the door of the Administration, led merely to the formulation of a meaningless resolution asking for a Commission team to study the causes that make villages unhealthy! (This resolution, passed on by the Commission to the Research Council, was examined by its Committee for Health at the second meeting of the Council, held in August at Sydney University. The Committee, which groups Directors of Health Services from most of the South Pacific territories—men to whom the primary cause of the unhealthy village, in the apathy or hostility of the average villager towards even the most elementary measures of hygiene, is only too well known after years of struggling against it—committed upon the resolution with a legitimate despair.)

The majority of delegates read speeches obviously prepared for them. In the case of the average Melanesian, it was clear that, despite painstaking coaching to prepare him for the sudden ascent to international conference level, he could do little more than discharge the duty of presenting his paper faithfully; he could not be expected to sustain a discussion of any depth. Many dangers are inherent in such a situation, and will remain until such time as all the delegates have attained the capacity for genuine independent thought. To the Australian, sensitive to the reaction of delegates from the Australian territories, the interest and modest eagerness to learn displayed by the Papuan and New Guinea representatives were reassuring, and their performance in general reflected credit on the patient work of the administrative officers concerned.

The Chairman, in opening the Conference, referred to it as an informal "parliament of South Pacific peoples". He stressed the limits of its functions, confined to making recommendations on a range of topics from which political questions were rigorously excluded. There was no attempt at any time to overstep these prescribed boundaries. The Secretary General of the Commission and the head of the Research Council addressed the meeting on the objects and work of the Commission, created to promote the welfare of the territories. Discussions were nourished also from time to time by statements contributed by the Executive Officers of the

Council, who described work already in hand in the various fields under review.

The Conference adopted a series of resolutions which were examined by the Commission at its fifth session, held in Suva immediately afterwards. A proposal to hold a conference of filariasis experts in Tahiti next year was put forward by the delegation from French Oceania, where a filariasis research team is at present working. This proposal was discussed by the Research Council and is likely to be put into effect. Most resolutions expressed desires which are already being met by the Works Programme of the Council, drawn up after examination of the needs of the area by men highly qualified by experience and special knowledge to decide what action can most usefully be taken. Their value thus lay primarily in confirming the direction of the Commission's work and associating with it some of the weight of representative native opinion. This value will be increased in proportion as the native representatives can retain a genuine interest in the programme beyond the period of the Conference itself, and can show themselves true leaders of their people by helping to induce in them the indispensable awareness of the part they must themselves play. The establishment, proposed for certain territories and approved by the Research Council, of native committees to provide a permanent link between the Commission and the local populations, seems certain to be of great interest in this regard.

Of much more significance than the formal issue of the Conference was its educative value to delegates of whom some had not before voyaged beyond the confines of their own islands. The abundant opportunities for informal interchange with their Pacific neighbours whose wide range of culture and attainments is offset by many common factors of environment and heritage, provided a more enriching, since more accessible, experience than could be gained from the abrupt transition to a metropolitan mainland. The importance of travel and of contacts of this kind is particularly vital at a stage in South Pacific history when all the islands are being called upon increasingly to assume an adult role in the world community. The well-ordered island of Fiji itself furnished an admirable setting, offering in many respects an example to all other territories. Informal exchanges were fostered by a hospitable programme of entertainments. Outstanding among these was an afternoon visit to the island of Bau, home of the celebrated Cakobau family, where Fijians performed brilliantly colourful traditional dances against the lush green background of a meadow that seemed incredibly to have acquired the character of the English

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countryside. The ceremony of fire-walking was presented also one afternoon at Nasinu, and a party filling two Catalinas made a visit of inspection to the leper station on Makogai.

In summing up the Conference, everyone was agreed that it had been a successful occasion, and one that marked a historical point in the development of the Pacific. Delegates showed great interest in plans for the next meeting to be held probably in the latter half of 1952. Australia put forward a suggestion for holding it in the Central Highlands of New Guinea, which is being examined by the Secretariat together with other possibilities. Meanwhile much of the ultimate value of holding periodic island conferences of this kind will depend on the degree to which delegates are able to maintain their interest in the Commission's activities and to assist it by actively seeking the co-operation of their peoples in the various projects designed to raise their living standards. This will be clearer at the next meeting; and then too it may be expected that a more fertile exchange will begin to occur in argument. Perhaps the day will not seem impossibly remote when the vast scattering of disparate islands may achieve a sense of unity, and when there may at last take form some common will of South Pacific peoples.

The Australian Political Scene.

F. Crean.

An article in the March issue of *The Outlook* dealt with the result of the last Federal election and the issues which might be said to have been the determinants of that result. Since that time the first Session of the Parliament has been held; but by reason of the different majorities in the Representatives and the Senate, whilst there has been much talk, there has been little legislative flow.

Apart from routine measures there have been four measures contemplated by the Government, the Commonwealth Bank Bill, the Communist Party Dissolution Bill, the Senate Reform Bill and a measure providing Child Endowment for the first child. The last measure has become law and has been operative since July. Its passage might be said to have been a strategic triumph for the Government in so far as the Labour Party had opposed it in principle during the election, because, they said, the granting of it would be taken into consideration by the Arbitration Court in determining the basic wage. At least consistently the Labour Party sought to include in the Bill a clause to the effect that the granting of endowment to the first child should not be taken into consideration by the Court, but Labour members were on a rather sticky wicket when they sought to increase the proposed 5/- weekly to 10/-. These amendments were persisted in by the Senate, or rather the Bill sent back with such a request, but the Government threatened that if this were insisted on the Bill would be dropped, and the Bill was finally carried in its original form.

Incidentally, it still remains to be seen whether the contention of the Labour Party in regard to the basic wage is a correct one. Some advocates for the employers have already insisted that it should be considered, but there is also a substantial body of opinion which maintains that Child Endowment as a constitutionally valid form of Social Service ought not to be a factor in computing the wage.

This, of course, throws into relief the larger problem of wage determination in Australia, for it is probably true to say that nowhere in a democratic community is there a single body charged

with so much responsibility as the Commonwealth Arbitration Court. Here is a body set up under a very limited power in the Constitution to deal only with disputes extending beyond the borders of any one State yet able, in effect, to make determinations which are beyond challenge anywhere in the Commonwealth. The Court itself drew attention to the Constitutional position in the judgment on the 40 Hour Case:

"The evolution of this court from an industrial tribunal limited to the particular task in each case, to an institution having in effect wide legislative powers, is an interesting one which some one will one day explore. This legislative power is so great indeed as to occupy a field from which the Federal Parliament is excluded; so paramount as to override in appropriate cases the State legislation, and so vital as to make the law for Australians in that realm which touches them most closely and intimately, viz. their industrial relations filling half the waking hours of their working days. It is a matter of striking comment that in a democracy so much responsibility and so much legislative power should be imposed on and trusted to three men appointed for life and beyond the reach of the popular will."

To revert, however, to the other measures in the Parliamentary Session. Banking was, of course, an issue at the election campaign and whilst the Government Party claimed during the election that if returned they would repeal the Bank Nationalization Act, they were not equally specific as to how far they would go in altering the structure and powers of the Commonwealth Bank. For the Labour Party, of course, the return to "Board Control" is something against which it takes a dogmatic stand. On this issue, which applies equally to any issue about which the Parties differ in principle, we may consider the difficulty which is occasioned by the different Party majorities in the two Houses—a Liberal-C.P. majority in the Representatives and a Labour majority in the Senate.

Both Houses are elected on adult suffrage, but at different periods and in different aggregations, and whatever may have been the original intention concerning the Senate, it is not in fact anything but a Party House. It cannot be expected then, if a particular Party takes a stand in one House on what is regarded as a matter of "Party Principle," that its Party supporters in another place will take a different stand about the same matter. Thus in present circumstances deadlock must ensue. The classical theory of the Second Chamber never contemplates that the two Houses shall be equal

either in powers or franchise. In the former case the Houses menace each other, in the latter they tend to duplicate each other.

The Australian Senate suffers from a double disability. It is elected on adult franchise as is the Representatives and except in the matter of Money Bills its powers are identical with the Representatives. It is true that provision is made, in the event of a deadlock, for a double dissolution, but this process has been used only once in the fifty years of the Commonwealth, and on that occasion it spelled disaster for the Government which invoked it.

The method of election for the Senate was changed during the life of the last Parliament to provide for voting by Proportional Representation, and this method of voting and the prospect of the second double dissolution are the genesis of the Menzies Government's Senate Reform Bill. In brief, this Bill provided that in the event of a double dissolution the ten Senators from each State shall not all be elected at one ballot but, in effect, there shall be two ballots held conjointly, at which two lots of five Senators will be elected. The reason for this device is that if all ten Senators were elected at once, each State would most likely return five Labour and five non-Labour Senators which would involve difficulty in the Senate itself.

In some quarters the previous double dissolution was regarded as "a fraud upon the power"; this new device might be regarded as "a fraud upon the system of Proportional Representation" by the devotees of that system (who sometimes mistake mathematics for politics). (Incidentally, the same political result would be achieved by electing 9 Senators and 1 Senator, or 7 Senators and 3 Senators, as by electing two groups of 5 Senators.)

The Labour Party has opposed this Bill on the ground that it does nothing to solve the real problem of the Second Chamber but is only a device to get over an immediate political difficulty. The Party, of course, lays itself open to the charge that it had eight years or so in which to have tackled the broader problem. All that was done was to alter the method of voting, nothing was done in regard to the powers of the Senate.

Both during the election and in the Governor's Speech the Government announced its intention to legislate to declare illegal the Communist Party in Australia.

This issue has, of course, been a controversial one in Australian politics for a number of years, but whilst the Labour Party was in power it asserted that to bar the Communist Party would only be to drive the organization underground and that the proper way

to defeat its menace was by defeating it in the Trades Unions and legislating to prevent the conditions in which Communism could flourish. The Liberal Party on the other hand has suggested that more "direct measures" are needed.

The Bill, as introduced, contained provisions for the dissolution and suppression of the Communist Party, for the forfeiture of all its property without compensation, and to these provisions the Labour Party did not offer any opposition. The Bill, however, provided that certain groups and individuals thought to be associated with communism might be "declared"^{*} and there would be thrown on declared persons and organizations the burden of proving innocence. This the Labour Party has held to be contrary to democratic legal principles and contrary to public opinion.

At the Parliamentary recess the position still stood that the Labour Party was opposed to the so-called "onus of proof" clauses, but since that time the Korean episode has intervened and there has been no indication at this stage whether opinion has changed in consequence.

Apart from legislative matters there are one or two administrative acts of some importance which have been implemented.

Petrol rationing was abolished early in the life of the Government as had been promised during the election. Whilst undoubtedly more petrol is being consumed in consequence the Government has been rather discreet in its information as to whether the additional consumption has involved additional dollar expenditure as the Labour Party maintained it would.

Similarly, with the removal of butter rationing the home consumption must have increased and here, whilst the question is not that of currency, it might be asked what have been the effects on the shipments of "Food for Britain" about which the Government had been so critical whilst in Opposition.

During the election campaign the Liberal Party had claimed that if returned to office there would follow both reductions in taxation and in the number of people on the Government pay-roll. Here again, actual office seems to have shown that these things are not so easily done as said, and at the moment there is no reduction either in the number of employees or in rates of taxation.

The question of taxation, however—and particularly the Income Tax—is another example of the failure in Australia to face up to the realities of a situation. Since 1942 what is familiarly known

* Persons "declared" would be disqualified from holding office under the Commonwealth or its instrumentalities or industrial organisations declared by the Governor-General to be engaged in a vital industry. [Editor].

as Uniform Taxation has been in operation, whereby the Commonwealth is the sole authority to levy Income Tax. There are, undoubtedly, from the point of view of the individual taxpayer, many advantages in such a scheme; but also it now appears from a public finance aspect that the progressive Income Tax is a necessary adjunct to the machine of State. From a practical point of view it is most satisfactory if collected by a single authority, but what has yet to be evolved is a satisfactory formula for distribution, as between the Commonwealth and the States, of the amount that has been collected. At the moment the distribution is about half-way between what the States collected when the scheme came into operation and a per-capita distribution. By 1957 the scheme should be on a per-capita basis but not in relation to any definite needs basis.

Here is a problem which is probably the central problem of Federal Government today — it has arisen, incidentally, both in Canada and the United States of America as well. The responsibilities of the central government are increasing in all three Federations, and yet considerable responsibilities still rest with the States; further, in all three, the financial power, by reason of the use of the progressive Income Tax, has gravitated to the central government. The central government is reluctant on the one hand to hand back money which it is responsible for collecting to another body to spend, and the States on the other are chary of handing over powers which Constitutionally are theirs, to the central government to exercise. Such a dilemma will not be resolved by spouting about a "vicious principle" on one side or "state rights" on the other. It will only be resolved when the different levels of Government, which do not after all represent abstractions but people, and the same people at different geographic levels, determine to find a solution.

One possible pattern would be for the States to retain their existing powers over education, health, etc., but for there to be worked out a national standard of expenditure under each head or sub-head of power and the Commonwealth to provide the requisite finance.

The question of rising prices, or what is sometimes glibly referred to as "putting value back in the £" (here, by the way, to an individual it is not only the "value" of the £ which is important so much as the number he is receiving) is another question which looms large on the political horizon.

One immediate remedy, revaluation, could be resorted to but this apparently has dangerous political ramifications. It would mean a reduction in the income of those who sell overseas and a reduction

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in the costs of those who buy overseas—a grower would get less for his wool or wheat, but his new car would cost less to buy.

To some the important angle is not that of currency but of production, what is required, it is argued, is great use of machinery and more efficiency in production techniques—to some the worker is not giving a "fair day's work for a fair day's pay", but, as we have already argued, there is no satisfactory machinery for determining either what is a fair day's work or a fair day's pay, or as to how, if production is increased, that increase shall be shared as between wages and profits. The Trades Union movement is inclined to assert that what is required is for the Commonwealth Government to resume powers over Price Control. Here again the matter has gone little beyond the stage of mutual recrimination and little has been done to evolve a pattern of solution.

To turn now to State politics:

The last twelve months have seen State General Elections in all six States and a strange feature is the close equipoise which exists in most of the States. South Australia is the only State in which there is a really decisive margin for the Government, and there the Playford tradition coupled with the distribution of electoral boundaries are really the explanation of the situation.

New South Wales and Queensland have had Labour Governments for a long period and both have returned to office after the elections by a slender majority, which would indicate little enthusiasm for the Government, but less for the alternative. It would seem, in looking at results in all States and also at Commonwealth results, that there is a hard core of support for the Labour Party of about 45%-47% of the total electorate, something similar for the non-Labour groups, and that the success or failure of a particular group at an election depends upon their ability to sway a few per cent. of the total electorate. In consequence political propaganda at election times tends to be aimed at a pretty low level, and successful groups which have inveigled votes on a variety of minor issues then seek to claim on major issues a mandate.

In Western Australia the Liberal Government survived by a very slender margin and in Tasmania under its Proportional Representation voting system, the last man elected, an Independent, is in a position to determine the fate of the Government, which can hardly be said to be the wish of the electors.

Probably, however, the strangest situation is in Victoria, and it is perhaps necessary to explain the situation here in more detail.

Normally, it is possible to divide the political groupings in Aus-

tralia fairly safely into the categories Labour and non-Labour, the latter including both the Liberal and Country Party. In Victoria the Country Party has followed a more individual line for whilst "ideologically" akin to the Liberal Party, in practice the Party has sometimes taken office on the promise of Labour support.

In Victoria, as in South Australia, the electoral boundaries are so drawn as to give an undue advantage to the country vote, which is, of course, the stronghold of the Country Party. At the recent election in May last, the strength of the parties was Liberal 27, Labour 25 and Country Party 13 (the number of votes recorded for Labour was approximately 500,000, for the Country Party 120,000, which indicates the disparity referred to), and ironically it is the Country Party, the smallest numerically, which has formed the government, on the assurance that if certain legislation is brought down the Labour Party will support the Government. The Labour Party can justify its stand on the ground that immediately after an election there is a constitutional obligation to attempt to form a stable government and, in the circumstances, from its point of view a Country Party administration is preferable to a Liberal. Labour and Country Party jointly have an overwhelming majority in the Assembly, but in the Legislative Council the Liberal Party has 18 members out of 34. Included in the 18 Liberal Party members are 2 members of the Country Party who left that Party only a few months before the election. There is some possibility at this stage that these two dissidents will once more return to the Country Party fold. At the time of writing no vote has taken place to indicate what their intentions really are.

At present, however, there is a Bill before the Legislative Assembly to provide for adult franchise for the Legislative Council. This will undoubtedly pass through the Assembly, but its fate in "another place" cannot be predicted.

There will be some difficulty so far as Victoria is concerned in the event of a Federal election because there would then be the situation of a Country Party opposed to the Liberals on a State basis, but fighting a united front for Federal purposes. However, just now a Federal election in the near future is only a matter of gossip.

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Book Reviews.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD HISTORY. By John B. Rae and Thomas H. D. Mahoney. xv+831 pages. (McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1949).

Doctors Rae and Mahoney have written a clear and useful textbook. In their forthright introduction they lay down a few principles worth the attention of all teachers of history. They write on the assumption that the history of the United States should be studied in its proper setting as part of the general growth of modern civilisation. They assume that the proper function of a textbook is "to provide the student with essential basic data in as compact form as possible, leaving him with the maximum opportunity for supplemental reading." To this end the book is provided with a useful bibliography containing references to many original sources. Such subjects as philosophy, literature and the arts are omitted, as the authors deem mere "survey" chapters of the familiar kind to be no more than time-wasting catalogues of names. The bibliography contains some references to these subjects although not in sufficient numbers.

The most important criticism of this work is that, despite the excellence of its conception—or perhaps because of it—the net achievement is less than intended. The authors have not altogether been able to evade the trap of writing history in succeeding sections, dealing alternatively with the United States of America and with the rest of the world. Too little attention is given to the reactions of the world in general to the policies and attitudes of the United States of America. The concluding chapter is disjointed and lacks integration with the remainder of the work.

There can be no doubt, however, that this book will be welcomed, used and valued. In teaching I have already found it to be highly esteemed by students and distinctive in its point of view.

—John M. Ward.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE AGE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP. By R. Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony. xiv+947 pages. (McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1950.)

Designed as a textbook for courses of study in International Relations, this joint work by Strausz-Hupé and Possony possess several distinct merits. It brings together a great deal of useful information on topics ranging from diplomacy to the influence of geography on foreign policy. It reprints such important documents as Pitt's Memorandum of January 19, 1805, and the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-aggression (with the secret additional protocols). It cites a wealth of precedent. It pleads no special cause save that of the ideals of democracy in general. Students may well be grateful for a work generally so well informed and so well designed for facile reference.

Where the book exhibits a serious weakness is in its arrangement. Quite rightly the authors have refrained from adopting a purely chronological arrangement and have avoided the danger also of over-stressing the importance of existing international law and organisation. But their arrangement, which is based on an analysis of the elements of power, is so highly personal and contentious that few teachers would care to adopt it. Whether serious students would relish an

analysis in terms of what the authors call "The Game," "The Chips," "The Rules," "The Stakes" and so on, is highly doubtful.

Fortunately, the work is so written that its undeniable merits should be welcomed by teachers and students of international relations, who seek a convenient text book.

—John M. Ward.

ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND THE WEST, by H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen.

Vol. I. Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century, Part I. Oxford University Press. Published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. pp. xi—313—\$3 (Appendices)—20 (Indices).

This solid yet most readable tome comprises the first part of Volume I of a study of the impact of Western civilization on Moslem culture in the Near East, that is, before the strong influence of the West came to be fully exerted.

As such it forms an essential preliminary to the study of these Western influences themselves, while the clear and constructive treatment of the various factors provides an excellent review of the bases of Moslem society in all parts of the world. It performs also the necessary task of sifting and condensing the extensive, but very unequal, literature on this subject. The reliable information so acquired is further eked out from other sources, and built into a constructive survey on the basis of the authors' personal knowledge of the Moslem people dealt with, and their keen appreciation of the human factors that underlie the organisation and growth of any society.

This revealing survey of Moslem society and institutions (which the work provides) derives much of its value from the solid human basis on which it is built up, namely the recognition of the importance of the family as the underlying unit, and of the village community as "next to the family the most important social unit in all Moslem countries outside Arabia." As Moslem writers themselves have been all too prone to underestimate, or even to ignore, the social and economic value of the agricultural population, being content to take them for granted, it is more often from European than from Moslem writers that the authors have here had to draw their factual material.

Next to these two fundamental factors, there are the various types of nomads especially in Arab countries that have left their mark on Moslem social structure. Only after this do industry (mainly carried on in the cities) and commerce (introducing alien elements and external entanglements) enter into Moslem life. Finally there is the City as a civic entity which has played a considerable part. Having been made familiar with this structure, the reader is enabled to consider the growth of Government and Administration, of the Army, of Religion and Education, and of the Law, as natural developments of community life. Other influences such as those of Slavery and of the non-Moslem minorities go to complete the picture.

On this basis we are next introduced to the various institutions of the Ottoman Empire. Above all stands the *Sheria*, the Sacred Law of the Orthodox, which retained a gradually diminishing fluidity only during the first six centuries of Islam. The practical relations between the Ottoman Emperor and his subjects were regulated down to the most minute details not only of status, rights and duties, but also of ceremonial, dress, turbans and so forth, by the *Kanuns* or Imperial Regulations. Their Byzantine rigidity was somewhat toned down by the human qualities of the *Adat*, or local established custom, another important factor in the practice of Moslem society.

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The embodiment of temporal as well as religious supremacy in the person of the Caliph and Sultan is closely explained, with a backward glance at the influence of those early centuries of Islamic philosophy when the practice of the Prophet Muhammad was woven into a fabric that included elements from the traditions of ancient Arabia and Persia, the theories of Plato and Aristotle, those of the Sunni jurists—and the needs of practical government.

The administrative machinery by which the Sultan's sovereign power was exercised is traced from its Persian origins, through the rules of the Abbaside, Gaznavide and Seljuk Sultan, the deep-going Byzantine bureaucratic influence, down to the final Ottoman administrative structure, including the Army, the Imperial Household, the Ottoman Navy, the Central Administration, as well as the Government of the Provinces. Upon the present reviewer who spent several years trying to unravel the inherited rights of the Heirs to Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the chapters on Land Tenure, Peasantry and Agriculture, exercised a wistful attraction, recalling a long struggle through the theory of land tenure and the practices of the Land Registry in a—usually vain—attempt to disentangle fact from fancy.

Commerce, industry and the City as a vital social and political factor receive full and clear treatment. Trade and Craft Guilds, including the fascinating Criminal Guilds, and their revolutionary origins, are reviewed, and the influence of foreign trade on foreign entanglements is set forth.

Altogether a work which none can omit to study who wishes to acquire a clear picture of the essentials of Moslem social institutions as they had developed before the strong impact of the West hit the Ottoman Empire.

—John de La Valette.

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE FAR EAST. By Pauline Tompkins. (Macmillan, New York, 1949. pp. XIV, 426. Maps and bibliography. \$5.00).

The "time of troubles" in the post-war period, when "warm friendship has turned to cold war", has led to a more critical examination of American-Russian relations than during the high noon of the war-time honeymoon. Dr. Tompkins has attempted a re-evaluation of relationships between the two countries from Jefferson to MacArthur. She devotes two-thirds of the volume to a detailed study of the period 1914-1932, and here she has been assisted materially by access for the first time to the Department of State Archives for these years. In addition she has used the private papers of a number of prominent diplomats and statesmen, made available by the Division of Manuscripts of the Library of Congress.

In her introduction, Dr. Tompkin has made clear her own viewpoint. Although science has "rendered obsolete any kind of world except one that is united . . . the tremendous social, psychological, cultural and religious differences among earth's inhabitants make the concept of a united world ludicrous to the generality of men, and immensely complicate its achievement". "The twentieth century is, therefore, a century with an ultimatum: unite or perish. There is no middle course" (p.xii). To her the alarming thing is American sponsorship and support for the United Nations at the same time as she has embarked upon a balance of power policy designed to preserve the sovereign nation state. The whole concept of a balance of power is dangerous and inherently unstable. "The pages which follow, therefore, contain an oblique attack on the doctrine of balanced power, the more damning because it emerges as a by-product of the central theme. In the opinion of the author, the balance of power theory is

essentially spurious and misleading. It is parading before the nations under false pretences, with glib promises of peace which lie totally beyond its competence" (p. xiii) (cf 336-7).

Yet despite this "oblique attack on the doctrine of balanced power", Dr. Tompkins has written a critical and honest piece of work. In her opening chapter, she dispels the "quixotic myth" of traditional American-Russian friendship, and points out that although there have been no military conflicts between the two countries, this has arisen in fact out of the vast distances which have separated them and which provided few points of conflict. Any community of interests was negative in character; it was based upon a common hostility to Britain rather than upon any positive friendship or interest. With the emergence of America as a great power at the end of the nineteenth century and the re-orientation of her relations with Britain, the conditions for mutual tolerance disappeared.

The most interesting portion of the book is the detailed examination of Russian-American relations from the outbreak of the first world war to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. American interests in the Far East had been formulated in Hay's Open Door policy in China. This policy has always been a curious compound of idealism and hard commercial horse-sense by a power entering the export and investment field in the Far East in the wake of the European powers. The twin principles of the open door and most favoured nation were increasingly endangered by rival imperialisms, and America, reluctant to use force, was compelled to resort to diplomatic pressure to achieve its purposes. The real threats came from Japan and Russia, and the central theme of Dr. Tompkins's book is the triangular struggle in the Far East between America, Japan and Russia.

After the diplomatic defeats of the decade 1905-14, during which the last vestiges of traditional American-Russian friendship disappeared, American policy was guided more and more by the compulsions of power politics. The attempt of Japan to make use of the "opportunity of a thousand years" presented by war in 1914 made clear to Washington the aggressive nature of her policy on the mainland. The major threat to American interests came from Japanese imperialism, and this produced a curious paradox in American policy. Despite the growing hatred of communism after 1917, a hatred which led Ambassador Francis to refer to the "tyrannical rule of a ruthless, conscienceless and bloodthirsty oligarchy, directed by a man with the brain of a sage and the heart of a monster", American policy became increasingly one of protecting Russian interests in the Far East. Japanese threats to China's territorial integrity and her attempts to extend her boundaries to Siberia appeared equally to threaten the vested interests in all other powers in the area. As President Wilson told Polk, "Irrespective of what our policy may be toward Russia, and irrespective of future Russian developments, it is essential that we maintain the policy of the open door with reference to the Siberian and particularly the Chinese Eastern Railroad" (p. 136). The principle of the "territorial integrity of China" was extended to cover Soviet Asia. This lay at the root of America's Siberian policy and her reluctance to support any policy of intervention. True, America invariably distinguished between the "Soviet Government" and the "Russian State" and hoped that Soviet Asia "would be held in trust for a future democratic Russian government" (p. 261), but in fact the result of American policy was the preservation of the territorial integrity of Soviet Siberia. American protection of foreign rights in China throughout the twenties, and concern with the Japanese threat to Manchuria in 1930-31 meant in practice an attempt to safeguard a status quo as favourable to Russia as to America. "The dread terror of communism itself

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had been viewed a lesser evil than Japanese hegemony on the continent. Accordingly the integrity of Russia's soil had been zealously guarded even as the integrity of its soul had been doubted" (p. 188).

Simultaneously with this policy went a flat refusal to recognise the new Soviet government and to establish diplomatic relations with her. Contradictory policies often caused confusion in the public mind and created major difficulties in their implementation. Non-recognition seriously handicapped America's diplomatic activities in the Far East, enabled Japan to negotiate with Russia, and evoked vitriolic press comments from Moscow as well as provocative comment from Litvinov. Russia might well be pardoned for her failure to grasp the purposes of an American government pursuing a confused policy, often naively executed. Throughout the Siberian intervention, and again during the twenties, there were sharp differences and conflicts of opinion as between the State Department and the Army chiefs. Rather more weight should be attached to ideological forces as influencing and perhaps blurring the main lines of American policy.

Dr. Tompkins over emphasises the pure power political nature of American policy, even when she admits the tendency "to proclaim their Far Eastern formulae without the slightest intention of injecting therein the ballast of military and naval support" (p. 281). While recognising the existence of American commercial interests in the Far East, she makes but a cursory reference to them. Concern with the territorial integrity of Siberia was a concern also with the protection of American business interests there—the International Harvester Company, J. M. Coates, Westinghouse, Singer Sewing Machines and bankers attempting to preserves the consortium principle in China and Manchuria. America's economic stake was not a large one, but dollar diplomacy, as distinct from balance of power diplomacy, is a force that must be recognised. The fact that parallel policies were often pursued by both Russia and America, and that the protection of American interests often meant also the protection of Russian interests did not mean that Washington was pro-Russian, rather she was anti-Japanese.

The analysis of American-Russian relations from formal recognition in 1933 to the outbreak of the Pacific War is perfunctory and disappointing; the book lacks balance here. No attempt is made to explain why the Amau statement evoked no effective action although "the decisive date in this period of Asiatic diplomacy was April 18th, 1934, when the Japanese Foreign Office threw down the glove in the form of the Amau statement" (p. 278). (One would also like to know why "the American government missed its cue at the psychological moment" in 1922 (p. 183).) American Far Eastern policy is not clearly related here to the European or to the Chinese background. The divergence of policies since the Yalta agreement is treated in terms primarily of power politics, and here the argument is more lucidly put and more soundly based. Dr. Tompkins is forthright in her criticism of the ineptness of American policy and the dangers of power politics in the hands of two inexperienced and inept players. This can be seen with painful clarity in the case of Japan, which is cast for the role of an island in the outer defences of either America or Russia unless real agreement is reached by both of them.

This is a scholarly and interesting study of one of the important and critical phases of American foreign policy. It suffers a little from sticking too close to the documents. It is a pity that Dr. Tompkins has been able to use little Russian material: this would have illuminated some parts of her narrative and perhaps have strengthened her arguments. Beloff's work, drawing considerably on

Russian sources, complements Fischer, but has not been used at all. There is an excellent bibliography of American works on Far Eastern problems, and a useful appendix containing some of the more important documents. The text of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 14th February, 1949, was apparently released too late for inclusion.

—N. D. Harper.

THE LEFT WING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff (I.P.R.) (William Sloane Associates, New York. \$4.00. pp. 298, map, illustrations).

The authors review the international position of Southeast Asia, then discuss in detail communist activities in the five component countries, and set out their conclusions. As one of a series of studies on nationalism in East Asia it sets a high standard for readability and accuracy.

Among illiterate people, with traditions of theocracy and absolute monarchy, the personalities of leaders play a dominant role. For this reason and because such material is all too scanty, a particularly useful feature of the book is afforded by the section of Biographical Notes on outstanding leaders. These include, Indo-China (6), Thailand (9), Burma (18), Malaya (13), Indonesia (19).

Various world forces act upon the countries in this region, lying physically between India, China and Australia. As a result, the countries may gravitate into the Soviet orbit, gravitate into the orbit of the Western democracies, or may form a third, neutral bloc.

In considering the possible course of events, differences of geography and of leadership, and different policies followed by the colonial powers, have produced marked divergencies.

Two main features stand out; ardent nationalism, desire for independence, which provided the driving forces and released great social energy, and desire for redress of widespread economic grievances. The Communists have 'capitalised' both.

In an objective, factual and restrained survey, the authors have done great service by stressing that distrust rather than racial animosity has hindered agreements. They have also shown how, ironically enough, the natural reaction against 400 years of European domination has come to a head after the economy of Southeast Asia has been absorbed into the world economy. Indeed, this absorption contributed towards bringing matters to a head. Accustomed as they were to natural calamities, the peoples of Southeast Asia did not take so fatalistically to being caught up in world "boom and bust" cycles. They are now learning that national political independence does not give the solution to international economic interdependence.

Another result of Western contact has been the erosion of the traditional social order. Discontent grew and opportunities to express discontent multiplied. The new leaders aimed to oust the Western overlord, but do not wish to revive the old order. They are not too sure what will replace it.

Lacking local capitalists, socialism and government control has fitted best with the nationalist sentiments. There is no strong local bourgeoisie to counterbalance this movement. The intelligentsia are out of touch with the masses.

Communist propaganda has played upon the nationalist theme. It has also stressed the plausible line of the U.S.S.R.'s support for oppressed peoples and encouraged them to turn to the Communist parties for guidance. Communists are fighting the attractions of funds and technicians which the West could supply better than the U.S.S.R. Yet the result of Communist activity has not been

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impressive when the grim possibilities of post-war conditions in Southeast Asia are taken into account. The authors believe that the programme is not specifically geared to the needs of Southeast Asia and has not succeeded in winning the support of the masses. They suggest that Southeast Asia has not been given a high priority on the U.S.S.R.'s agenda of world revolution. They foresee a long period of ferment and adjustment in this area so peculiarly important to Australia.

—George Caiger.

MANCHURIA SINCE 1931. By F. C. Jones. (Oxford University Press, 1949).

This book is a useful and convenient study of Manchuria during the period in which it has assumed real importance for the modern world. Beginning with a survey of Manchuria in 1931, it covers particular aspects under the Japanese between then and 1945—Political and Administrative Organization (Chp. II); propaganda for "national" feeling (Chp. III); Treatment of Racial Minorities (Chp. IV); Japanese Immigration and Settlement (Chp. V); Currency and Finance (Chp. VII); Industrial (Chp. VIII); Agrarian (Chp. IX); and Commercial (Chp. X); Policy and Development as well as Development of Communications and Transport (Chp. VI); and finally Urban Conditions and Social Welfare (Chp. XI). The book concludes with a review of events between 1945 and 1947 (Chp. XII).

Between 1923 and 1930 the Chinese immigration was far more significant than Japanese after that date and just over 6 million Chinese entered Manchuria during those eight years (p. 8). Up to 1931 Manchuria was "dominated by a land-owning oligarchy primarily concerned for the maintenance of its ill-gotten gains and the immigrant settler became a tenant-farmer paying high rents in cash or in crops" (p. 9). In 1931 industrial development was only in its infancy. In general, Manchuria in 1931 was "primarily an agrarian country but one with a growing factory industry . . . chiefly devoted to the production of consumer goods" (p. 12). The whole region was under the military rule of the 'Young Marshal' Chang Hsueh-liang.

Japanese activity in Manchuria after September, 1931, when the 'famous incident' was followed by the overthrow of Chinese authority and the establishment of a puppet Government completely under the thumb of Japan can be understood only in the light of a very thorough background knowledge of Japanese history, which naturally this book does not provide. Detail cannot allow us to understand, nor can it change the essential nature, of the imposition by Japan of her will upon Manchuria after 1931. It is true that there was "ample opportunity for friction between these multifarious and often overlapping (Japanese) jurisdictions, and in particular . . . for conflict between the military and the civilian elements" (p. 16). It is true that the "national socialist" elements were from time to time significant both in Japan and Manchuria and that their activity was not always consistent with the best interests of Japanese capitalists and it is true that Manchuria was regarded as "an experimental laboratory" for the national socialists of the Kwantung Army, but it is doubtful if they ever did much which was inconsistent with the best interests of the capitalists and got away with it for long. Just as Korea and Formosa were treated as a place to give the Samurai something to do in the 1870's and 1880's, Manchuria occupied a similar role in the 1930's. It was all grist to the Japanese mill and the mill was in safe hands. 1932 was introduced with months in which the old and over-cautious were struck down (p. 22) and the pursuit of raw materials and power went on as it had done since 1868 or before. The logic of events led to Pearl Harbour.

The 'Manchukuo' Government was "essentially a Japanese one, with a Chinese facade which did not conceal the real state of affairs from either Chinese or foreign observers" (p. 28). The author points out (p. 29) that there were some "able men"—apparently in the sense that they had enough sense to see that a Manchuria in which the "moral and material welfare of the Chinese inhabitants" was improved a little would be a Manchuria stronger for Japan—but they were often "frustrated by the . . . petty Japanese official . . ." and apparently far more by the "Big Three" in Japanese military circles—the War Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Inspector General of Military Education—who "were largely independent of Cabinet control . . . (and) the first two had the right of direct access to the Emperor, which often meant the final voice in the decision of national policies" (p. 35). The government of Manchuria was then only a small part of the general plan and problem of government of Japan and it is strange how often these civilian *and* militarist threads found their way back to the Emperor.

Chapter III shows us an example of the Japanese attempt to foster "nationalism" in the countries they occupied yet at the same time making the more subject in every way to Japanese interests. This, of course, is an objective which always remained inconsistent within itself and "nationalist" co-operation was only forthcoming from those nationals who had no real love of their country or its people. However, the attempt was made and it extended from the enthronement of Mr. Henry Pu Yi and his wife Elizabeth—though never as a restoration of the Ching dynasty, because separation of Manchuria from China was essential to its Japanese absorption—down to "propaganda . . . through . . . press, radio, cinema, lecture hall, gaudy posters, railway and automobile tours by propaganda teams (p. 51) as well as a complete infiltration into what schools there were of bogus and synthetic ideas which obscured the genuine history and situation of Manchuria just as the Shogunate had once done for Japan. The author does not think that this had a great effect on the people and even where it did interfere "there was no one more adroit in the ways of passive obstruction and evasion of official demands and prohibitions" than the Chinese (p. 53). However, even the Chinese can be changed by propaganda and the author concludes that the "thirteen years of Japanese control . . . has meant that a considerable number of officials, teachers, technicians, and professional men have been educated by the Japanese and trained according to Japanese methods. This may have more than an ephemeral effect . . ." (p. 54). At least we would expect Japanese influence to be greater and to have an effect for longer in Manchuria than in any other part of the Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Chapter IV deals with the treatment of racial minorities and Japanese occupation began with a "Proclamation of Independence" in which it was declared that "there shall be no discrimination with respect to race and caste." The author points out how this conflicted with Kuomintang nationalist and racial theories and "Japanese policy in Manchuria and elsewhere in China was to encourage the non-Chinese peoples in resistance to Chinese assimilative tendencies, to fan their grievances and to foment rebellion (p. 58)." It did appear that the Mongols (or some of them) "were better off under the Japanese than under the Chinese" and that support was forthcoming from them (p. 68). The Koreans it appears were not so well off and they did not respond as well, whilst the Russians were definitely disappointed and many of them turned over to the Soviet Union later (p. 79). Altogether the Japanese were backing losing horses and even when they came home the price was so short they got little out of it. This was so because the numbers and influence of the racial minorities was so insignificant compared to the Chinese.

"The conquest of Manchuria was brought about by the Japanese Army chiefs for politico-strategic reasons (p. 140) and "Therefore, from the outset the Army made it crystal clear that 'Manchukuo' would be subject to a planned economic development" (p. 141). This really meant reducing the influence and scope of the Zaibatsu and in 1931 "the Zaibatsu bowed to the storm and the Army had its way in Manchuria." It must not be thought that Japan is the only country where old capitalists are subject to the competition of new and perhaps there is a tendency to get the conflict between the militarists and civilians a bit out of this context. However, the war with China gave the Army a little more than they could handle and Manchukuo, too, and so the old Zaibatsu came in for a little more than the share they had been getting (p. 150). As in Japan itself real planning did not begin until 1936-37 (p. 151). In general "the Japanese had built up in Manchuria an industrial potential . . . far ahead of anything . . . in Eastern Asia, exclusive of Japan herself and of the Soviet Far East . . . they had given primary emphasis to production for war purposes even before 1941 . . . they had largely integrated Manchurian industry to that of Japan . . . In the main, Manchurian mineral and metallic products were exported for manufacture . . . (to Japan) . . . managerial and technician groups were exclusively Japanese . . . Yet, had Manchuria reverted intact into Chinese hands, there would have been a good deal of (industry) which, with outside financial and technical assistance, would have aided China to repair the ravages of war" (pp. 164-166). But agriculture was "the Cinderella" in Japanese planning. This was partly the case because of neglect and partly because of the result of planning for military purposes, for as a result of it, labour was drawn away from the production of food crops and those crops which contributed mainly to consumption, towards the production of raw materials like cotton. There was, however, an increase in the production of maize. Timber production was greatly increased (p. 188) as a base for production of rayon and paper pulp.

In her commercial relations, Manchuria "was a disguised Japanese province and as the yen and the yuan were inseparably linked together after 1935 Japanese-'Manchukuo' trade was in a sense internal trade" (p. 203). In 1931, 38.5% of exports and 43% of imports were with Japan and Korea, whilst in 1938 these percentages had risen to 57.5% and 77.9%. As a percentage of import values, textiles, foods and agricultural products fell and metals, machinery and tools and chemicals increased, and as a percentage of exports agricultural products, livestock, etc., increased and metals, chemicals, etc., fell. One might have expected that there would be an increase in the proportion of exports represented by the products of manufacturing industries but the fact that there was no such increase seems to indicate the production by those industries of things that do not enter either into exports or home consumption—guns, tanks and other weapons of war. The Manchurian people were despatching more agricultural products from their shores and acquiring in return an industrial system more and more capable of producing war equipment.

Population increased in Manchuria during the years of Japanese occupation both from immigration and natural increase. The task of raising the general standards of personal hygiene and of effecting "any general improvement of public health was a formidable one" (p. 213) and whilst the Japanese took steps to "extend the system of officially appointing district physicians" and other steps as well, the problems remained unsolved partly because they depended upon the general standard of living. Between 1937 and 1940 the Hsinking Cost of Living Index rose from 106.8 to 225.4, food rising by about the same and clothing a little more. This was also the case in Japan itself for similar reasons, and

in China. The increase in cost of living and disappearance of much food altogether from markets continued after 1940. In many ways Manchuria was better off than China and Japan because it did not suffer the same amount of direct war damage up to 1945. However, social welfare and public health cannot be improved under such circumstances as these.

The final Chapter on Manchurian affairs during 1945-47 is not very satisfactory and appears to be based on newspaper reports. It does not really come to grips with the situation at all. It indicates the irreconcilable conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Japan and anything but certainty and co-operation in the relations of the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists, as well as those between the U.S.A. and the Chinese Nationalists. The author covers in a scrappy sort of way the looting and damage in Manchuria brought about by the Russians (who, "however, were not responsible for all the looting" (p. 225)), by the Japanese and in the fighting between the Chinese. The author has underestimated the Chinese Communists and writes as though the Nationalists were still a real Government at the end of 1947. He considers that Manchuria is no more than part of the problem of China and concludes that "The best guarantee of peace would be the emergence of a China strong enough to be independent of either (U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.) and to act as a stabilizing force in the Far East" (p. 241). Perhaps the idea of "stabilizing forces" has now been given up? Anyway, it is not likely to occur to anyone that the best way to achieve this might be to try leaving the government of China to the Chinese, even if the interests of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. would allow it. Assuming that a "strong China . . . independent of either" should be our objective: what should be the "Western" policy towards Communist China?

—J. F. Cairns.

Books Received.

KOREA TODAY. (George M. McCune, I.P.R. Harvard University Press).

A HISTORY OF CHINA. (Wolfram Eberhard, Routledge & Kegan Paul).

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF ASIA AND THE FAR EAST. (United Nations Publication).

NEW FORCE IN ASIA. (Bruno Lasker, I.P.R. The H. W. Wilson Co.).

THE LEFT WING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. (Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff, I.P.R. William Sloane Associates).

SOVIET TRADE UNIONS. (Isaac Deutscher) (R.I.I.A.).

INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES. (Lawrence K. Rosinger, I.P.R., The MacMillan Co.).

THE MIDDLE EAST. (R.I.I.A.).

A HISTORY OF CANADIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS. (G. P. de T. Glazebrook, C.I.I.A. Oxford University Press).

EMPIRE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC. (Gerald S. Graham, C.I.I.A. University of Toronto Press).

A COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. (Norman Bentwich & Andrew Martin, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.).

A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS (United Nations Publication).

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL. (International Labour Office).

PUBLIC HEALTH AND DEMOGRAPHY IN THE FAR EAST. (Balfour, Evans, Notestein and Taeubur. The Rockefeller Foundation).

Institute Notes.

Owing to the physical separation of the different Branches and their degree of local autonomy, members may not always remember that they are parts of a wider whole. It is not only that the Institute functions on a Commonwealth-wide basis. It is not only that there is a similar body in all the member nations of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In addition, affiliation with the Institute of Pacific Relations and a constant exchange of information and publications with some sixty other organisations, knit us into a world-wide pattern.

The sense of unity within Australia and with the wider world has been strengthened by two recent events, which coincided on June 26th, 1950. As a result, this day marks a turning point in the history of the Australian Institute. On that evening, in Adelaide, the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable R. G. Menzies, gave the first of the Roy Milne Memorial Lectures. He spoke on "The British Commonwealth of Nations in International Affairs." The lecture has been printed and given to all members of the Institute.

Some of the Prime Minister's observations on the machinery of consultation within the British Commonwealth of Nations prompted a question in the House of Commons and stimulated wider interest in this important problem.

On the same evening, June 26th, Bertrand Russell gave the first lecture of his two months tour of Australia. At public and private meetings organised by Branches of the Institute, Bertrand Russell spoke to over 12,000 people. His broadcasts, interviews and articles in the press brought him into contact with a much wider public. His fresh, individual, objective outlook; humour; amazing vitality and vigour of mind and his courage were among the attributes that aroused an eager response.

Bertrand Russell combined philosophic detachment and a vivid awareness of the past with a deep compassion for mankind. His visit more than fulfilled the hopes of the late E. C. Dyason, who wanted the lecturers to present existing facts in a new and arresting manner, as well as to break new ground.

Bertrand Russell heightened our sense of awareness and made more real to many the enormous burden which lies upon contemporary statesmanship, and upon public opinion in those countries where public opinion still counts.

The success of Lord Russell's visit was in no small measure due to the hard work of the Honorary Secretaries, the Secretaries and the members of many Branches.

Institute of Pacific Relations.

Efforts are being made to organise a representative delegation to the I.P.R. Conference from Australia. The subject for discussion, "Nationalism in the Far East and its International Consequences," has already produced some useful data papers. The Australian papers are as follows:

Australia's Economic Interests in the Far East. (E. E. Ward).

Australian Population Policy and its Relation to Demographical Problems in Asia. (W. D. Borrie).

Australian Foreign Policy and the Indonesian Dispute. (H. Wolfsohn).

Australia and the Peace Settlement with Japan. (N. D. Harper).

The absence of a Conference Fund which would enable assistance with expenses of delegates increases the difficulty of obtaining a well-balanced delegation.

Commonwealth Council Meeting.

A meeting of the Commonwealth Council was held in Sydney on 26th August, 1950. Four of the Branches were represented. Many decisions were made. Those of more general interest were, that, in view of the fact that all Branches end their financial year on June 30th, and hold their General Meetings after that date, it was agreed that the Annual Report of the Commonwealth Council should be published in the December issue of the Journal.

Professor A. H. McDonald was appointed Editor for the year ending August 31st, 1951.

In view of the rising costs it was decided that henceforth subscriptions to the "Australian Outlook" to non-members be at the rate of 15/- per annum, and that a charge of 4/- be made for a single copy.

As the grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York ends in December of this year, the Institute is faced with the problem of raising at least £700 to maintain its present functions, and more than that if its activities are to be expanded. A number of new Corporate members has been obtained, but the General Secretary will be visiting Melbourne for a period of two to three weeks in the near future. Mr. N. L. Cowper was elected as President for the ensuing year.

Visitors.

Better known as "A.P.H.", Sir Alan P. Herbert will be in Australia from 6th November to 15th January. He plans to visit all States and is prepared to give two public lectures and attend two formal lunches or dinners each week. The British Council has asked the Institute to co-operate by arranging his public lectures. A charge will be made for admission. It is confidently expected that this visit will be a great success.

The Branches are looking forward to the arrival of two Canadians, Prof. F. H. Soward, Professor of History and Director of International Studies at the University of Vancouver, and Douglas MacLennan, the National Secretary of the C.L.I.A., and Professor R. O. McGechan, National President of the N.Z.I.I.A. They are touring Australia on their way to the I.P.R. Conference at Lucknow, India.

Tasmanian Branch.

During a brief visit of the General Secretary, a meeting of the Tasmanian Branch was held in Hobart on September 4th. It was agreed to reorganise the Branch and to make a fresh start. Sir John Morris will be the Patron, Prof. Hytten, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Tasmania, was elected as President, and W. A. Townsley as Hon. Secretary.

Armidale Group. *

E. J. Tapp, M.A., Senior Lecturer in History, New England University College, Armidale, N.S.W., has published a pamphlet (16 pp.) entitled "From the League to United Nations". The outcome of a paper he gave to the Armidale Group and to the U.N.A.; it may be obtained for 1/-, plus postage, from the author.

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